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Abstract
Diagnosing Policy Dynamics:
The Birth & Evolution of the Pharmaceutical Subsystem
Katie R. Stores
The rising cost of prescription drugs in the United States has led patients—older
populations and the disabled especially, to seek relief through foreign nations, and internet mailorder sites, which are often hosted and condoned by state and local governments. Patients are
traveling to Canada and Mexico to purchase affordable prescription drugs. According to the
Congressional Budget Office, “American seniors alone will spend 1.8 trillion dollars on
pharmaceuticals over the next ten years” (U.S. Senate 2007, S 251). This research examines the
agenda status and change of pharmaceutical regulation by tracing the evolution of the
pharmaceutics subsystem. By employing a punctuated equilibrium approach, I seek to
understand if periods of agenda access and issue definition have corresponded to changes in the
institutional structure of policymaking.
As such, this study is motivated by three questions: (1) how has Congress governed the
pharmaceutical policy agenda over the post World War II era, (2) have periods of agenda access
led to venue changes in pharmaceutical regulation, (3) has the image of pharmaceutical policies
led to positive or negative feedback, and if so, what factors precipitated such change.
Understanding how image and agenda access can impact the institutional structure of
policymaking will illustrate how ideas influence the strength and weakness of the pharmaceutical
policy monopoly. The results of this study are important because they highlight the institutional
factors influencing the cost and availability of prescription drugs. Moreover, this research
provides insight concerning federal involvement in regulatory policy.
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1
Prescription Drug Importation as a Matter of Policy
“Due to the ever increasing prices of pharmaceuticals in the United States, compared to those in
many other countries, consumers and innovative entrepreneurs have devised various means of
obtaining cheaper pharmaceuticals…” Wertheimer and Santella 2007, 303
According to the Congressional Budget Office, “American seniors alone will spend 1.8
trillion dollars on pharmaceuticals over the next ten years” (U.S. Senate 2007, S 251). The rising
cost of prescription drugs in the United States has led state and local governments to openly
develop prescription drug importation mail-order sites to combat their increasing deficits and
offer affordable prescription drug benefits to state employees and retirees despite its illegality.
In addition, patients are traveling to Canada and Mexico to purchase affordable prescription
drugs. Despite the prohibition against prescription drug importation, the Food and Drug
Administration (FDA) has presently taken a lax approach to enforcement. But, the FDA has
threatened to pursue more serious ramifications if the states continue to pursue drug importation
from foreign non-approved FDA facilities.
A range of actors from local, state, federal government, industry, as well as professional
societies and organizations have become active in the area of prescription drug importation
policy. Despite coalition efforts, legislative progress to allow the importation of prescription
drugs by pharmacists, wholesalers, and consumers has been stymied. Prescription drug
importation is presented in this introduction as an illustration of subsystem resistance to change-a concept explored more broadly throughout the analysis. I seek to understand the dynamic
governing the evolution of pharmaceutical policy as a case study in how positive and negative
feedback shape policy subsystems. Specifically, this research examines how Congress governs
the multidimensional nature of pharmaceutical policy.
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Prescription Drug Importation: An Example of Subsystem Resistance
Drug importation, occurs when prescription drugs are imported into the U.S. from other
countries. According to the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services (HHS), imported
drugs can be classified as either personal imports (internet sales or purchases by customers who
travel across the border) or commercial imports (pharmaceuticals purchased by pharmacies and
wholesalers for resale) (HHS Task Force on Drug Importation 2004). Re-importation, on the
other hand, occurs when FDA approved drugs manufactured in the U.S. and exported to foreign
countries are brought back into the United States (Ornes and Hendrix 2006, 15). Imported drugs
can be classified by the following types according to Wertheimer and Santella: (1) legally
imported drugs, “which include those manufactured in foreign but FDA—inspected facilities
meeting U.S. standards and those that were manufactured in an FDA—approved U.S. facility,
sent abroad, then reimported by the manufacturer under the requisite conditions,” (2) imported
drugs manufactured in a foreign facility that also produces the FDA—approved U.S. version, and
(3) a drug imported from a non-approved FDA facility (2007, 304; HHS Task Force on Drug
Importation 2004).
Currently, the Federal Food Drug and Cosmetic Act (FFDCA) prohibits individual or
commercial importation of prescription drugs by anyone other than the manufacturer. During the
mid-1980s unsafe prescription drugs were being reimported back into the United States, which
prompted Congress to pass the 1987 Prescription Drug Marketing Act (PDMA) (as detailed in
chapter 3). The PDMA “included a provision… [making] it illegal for anyone other than drug
manufacturers to import pharmaceuticals into the United States” (Congressional Research
Service 2002, 1). Section 801 (d)(1) of the FFDCA states no “drug…which is manufactured in a
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state and exported may be imported into the United States unless the drug is imported by the
manufacturer of the drug” (Congressional Research Service 2002, 1).
Pharmaceutical manufacturers may import prescription drugs if: 1) the pharmaceuticals
have been manufactured for or by them in the foreign country and 2) guidelines prescribed by the
Food and Drug Administration concerning manufacture and distribution are enforced (Benjamin
and Levinson 2004, 55). As stipulated in section 804 (j)(3) of the FFDCA, the Food and Drug
Administration (FDA) has implemented a “personal use” policy, at the discretion of U.S.
customs, in order to allow citizens to purchase a 90 day supply of non-FDA approved drugs from
foreign countries for “compassionate use” (Congressional Digest 2003; Ornes and Hendrix 2006,
16). The compassionate use policy was initially adopted to facilitate treatment for lifethreatening diseases, such as cancer and AIDS and illustrates the pharmaceutical monopoly was
not complete. These disease based interest groups end up forming part of the advocacy coalition
that creates the opportunity for subsystem arrangements to be broken up or maintained.
Advocacy Coalitions
As noted by Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith, the policy process operates within policy
subsystems, which are composed of coalitions (1993, 150). Coalitions include business
representatives, interest groups, trade associations, federal agencies, legislative committees, as
well as elected officials, scholars, and members of the press (Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith 1993,
150). Following an examination of the prescription drug importation debate, I have identified
three coalitions. The safety coalition members primarily include a select group of government
officials, the FDA, the Health Care Distribution Management Association (HDMA), representing
distributors, and the Pharmaceutical Research and Manufacturers Association (PhRMA) (Ornes
and Hendrix 2006, 18; Stearn 2004, 538; Wertheimer and Santella 2007, 310). This coalition

3

believes imported pharmaceuticals create a public health risk that far outweighs any cost benefit.
These importation opponents suggest policies to allow legal importation will result in an influx
of unsafe and counterfeit drugs.
According to Stearn, Congress can address international counterfeit pharmaceutical
imports based on the following legislative jurisdiction: territorial, national, protective, passive
personality and universal jurisdiction (2004, 541). Although practical matters of gathering
evidence, ethical rules, and jurisdiction and extradition present major difficulties in prosecution.
Therefore, to protect the U.S. public from fake pharmaceuticals, Stearn suggests, foremost, the
FFDCA should explicitly apply to foreign companies and individuals who are involved in the
distribution of drugs and devices in the United States (2004, 550).
Critics of drug importation, including the Bush Administration, cite safety risks as cause
for abandoning this possible cost cutting approach (Guglielmo 2005; Melnitzer 2005). The
safety coalition suggests risks include counterfeiting and a lack of notification procedures when a
drug has to be recalled in another country (Young 2004, 874). Recent focusing moments such as
the halting of clinical trials by the National Institutes of Health (NIH), adverse long term trials on
popular medications, and Congressional support to expand adverse drug event requirements in
the pharmaceutical industry have contributed to raising safety concerns associated with
prescription drug importation (Wechsler 2005, 26). The Bush administration suggests
Americans should look to generic medications and prescription drug discount cards for lowercost solutions (Young 2005, 233).
According to the FDA, as much as 8% of the drug supply is counterfeit, which is defined
as products “without the active ingredient, with an insufficient quantity of the active ingredient,
with the wrong active ingredient or with fake packaging” (FDA 2004). The FDA has submitted
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letters to governors and state health officials to warn them of the liabilities incurred by
promoting the purchase of imported drugs (Davolt 2005, 65). States have countered the FDA by
assuring they have thoroughly reviewed the prescribing practices of state approved foreign
pharmacies. Supporters of drug importation suggest calls over safety concerns are merely scare
tactics, because drugs bought in developed countries have stringent pharmaceutical safety
regulations similar to the U.S. (Guglielmo 2005, 44).
These proponents of drug importation form the affordability coalition. Of the varied
stakeholders, consumer advocates such as the American Association of Retired Persons (AARP)
and the National Community Pharmacists Association (NCPA) support prescription drug
importation albeit under different stipulations. The AARP view importation as a way to increase
access, while the NCPA support legislation that would allow only pharmacists and wholesalers
to import prescription drugs (Ornes and Hendrix 2006, 17). Thus, cost and safety concerns are at
odds when current policy proposals are examined.
The level of activity by state and local governments is evidence of the wide-spread public
attention the issue of importation has received. State and local governments have openly
developed internet mail-order sites in order to combat their increasing deficits and offer
affordable prescription drug benefits to state employees and retirees despite its illegality. Illinois’
I-Save Rx and Minnesota's RxConnect Online are web based programs designed to facilitate
prescription drug purchases from Canada, Ireland, or the United Kingdom and Canada
respectively (Guglielmo 2005, 44). California, Illinois, Minnesota, New Hampshire, Oregon,
Rhode Island, Vermont, Wisconsin, and the local jurisdictions of Montgomery, Alabama,
Washington, D.C., Montgomery County, Maryland, Boston, Massachusetts, Springfield,
Massachusetts, and Caldwell County, North Carolina, are all facilitating or subsidizing the
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importation of prescription drugs for personal use (Davolt 2005; Guglielmo 2005; Teufel 2006).
Connecticut, Mississippi, and West Virginia have also passed pro-importation bills (Guglielmo
2005, 46).
Minnesota’s Department of Human Services has stated they have secured agreements
with Canadian pharmacies to require Canadian International Pharmacy Association membership,
a prescription from a U.S. physician, and exclusion of non-FDA approved medicines among
other requirements (Guglielmo 2005, 65). Not all states have welcomed drug importation
legislation. For example, Nevada passed a bill in 2003 barring illegally imported prescription
drugs. States who have championed the legalization of drug importation, suggest citizens are
already participating in drug importation; therefore, they have an obligation to maintain safety
standards for their residents.
When policy proposals are considered for legislation, the issue definition of importation
significantly influences the players involved and the policy beliefs that are accommodated.
Several pieces of legislation aim to modify the FFDCA to allow qualifying individuals, in
addition to pharmacist and wholesalers, to import prescription drugs. According to David
Kessler, former FDA commissioner, “the choice before [Congress] is not the choice of imports
or no imports. We already have a system of importation of drugs that jeopardizes public health.
Congress has the responsibility to fix this serious problem” (Mamudi 2005, 8). The U.S.
Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) released a report examining prescription drug
importation, which states the safety concerns of importing prescription drugs far outweigh any
cost savings. The report was required under the Medicare Prescription Drug, Improvement and
Modernization Act of 2003.
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The pharmaceutical industry, the profit coalition, suggests paying less for prescription
drugs will lead to less drug development, but factual evidence concerning the exact reduction in
research and development is scant (Mamudi 2005; Young 2005). The profit coalition includes
large firms whose activities involve basic and applied research, biotechnology, and generic, nonresearch based companies, distributors, trade associations, and affiliated organizations with a
profit motive. GlaxoSmithKline, Pfizer, AstraZenecca and Wyeth have made concerted efforts
to limit the importation of prescription drugs from Canada by stifling supplies to traditional and
internet pharmacies (Melnitzer 2005, 56).
As part of the Medicare Modernization Act of 2003, Congress instructed the Secretary of
Commerce to conduct a study on The Organization for Economic Co-Operation and
Development (OECD) drug price controls and the implications for U.S. consumers. The
Commerce study found “top foreign brand-name drugs cost 18-67% less than in the United
States, a factor that reduces manufacturer revenues by more than $20 billion annually and curbs
industry research and development” (Wechsler 2005, 27). Based on the reaction of the
pharmaceutical industry and current drug cost differentials, advocates suggest the HHS report
simply reflects pharmaceutical interests (Krisberg 2005, 1). The Pharmaceutical Research and
Manufacturers Association (PhRMA) supports the purchase of generic drugs and utilizing the
Medicare prescription drug benefit as alternatives to importation (Parekh 2005, 2).
The impact of legalized importation on manufacturer revenue and research and
development investment is inconclusive. According to Pecorino, when a good subjected to
negotiated prices and sold in a foreign country is legalized, the foreign country price becomes the
domestic price, because the barriers to market segmentation are removed (2002, 700).
“Allowing reimports always raises consumer surplus in the home country. Thus, in all of the
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cases analyzed, home welfare is higher under the reimport regime” (2002, 700). Further, profits
to the monopolist rise, because as prices in the foreign markets rise and prices in the United
States market decrease the differential would be indeterminate (Pecorino 2002, 707). Pecorino’s
findings would suggest pharmaceutical manufacturers would not experience revenue loss and
therefore should not have justification for decreased research and development investment.
In contrast, Scherer suggests regulation of pharmaceutical pricing will lead to substantial
hampering of research and development (1993, 113). According to Scherer, price controls would
inherently lead to insufficient profits, which would discourage technological progress. Thereby,
penalizing consumers, drug companies, and sacrificing the welfare of citizens in developing
countries (Scherer 1993, 113-14). Drug companies suggest high prescription drug prices in the
United States allows significant research and development, which would be impossible if
importation or price controls were implemented (Choudhry and Detsky 2005; Teufel 2006).
Economic theory does assert that fixed cost of drug development is most efficient when buyer
price differentials are exploited (Choudhry and Detsky 2005, 360).
However, according to Choudhry and Detsky drug development costs are likely
exaggerated. Drug companies earn profits on pharmaceuticals that utilize current delivery
mechanisms, and research is often funded by taxpayer research (2005, 360). Finally, “the
pharmaceutical industry spends twice as much on marketing, advertising, and administration
than on research and development” (Teufel 20006, 389). Therefore, drug company profits could
arguably be reduced without affecting innovation. Regardless of the exact price point-research
and development trade off, Teufel concludes while Congressional efforts to increase the
affordability of prescription drugs is admirable, the current solutions simply place an undue
burden on the FDA, which will inevitably sacrifice the “gold standard” assurance of drug safety
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and efficacy and simply pass on increased costs to manufacturers and pharmacies (Teufel 2006,
392-93).
In short, the debate surrounding drug importation centers on the cost savings available
from foreign price-controlled nations, and whether these cost benefits outweigh the safety and
profit concerns of importing pharmaceuticals. Prescription drug prices continue to rise with no
foreseeable end to the increasing profits garnered by the pharmaceutical industry or cost relief to
those most in need –the elderly, disabled, and the indigent. It appears alternative policy solutions
to deter or control the costs of prescription drugs have been superseded by the call for
prescription drug importation, despite questions of safety.
When the U.S. House of Representatives passed the Pharmaceutical Access Act of 2003
(H.R. 2427), which opened the door for the re-importation of prescription drugs, lobbyist waged
a battle to protect their estimated $1.8 trillion dollar industry at stake (Gokcekus, et al. 2006;
U.S. Senate 2007, S 251). Yet, despite the undisputed influence of the pharmaceutical lobbying
machine the bill passed the House. Consumer advocates, pharmaceutical manufacturers,
insurers, state health plans, citizens, and employers all have cause to monitor the actions of
Congress concerning pharmaceutical policy. The policy players dominating the debate will have
serious implications on the outcome of pharmaceutical pricing and regulation.
Purpose and Organization
The first aim of my study is to describe the evolution of pharmaceutical policy. Despite
the numerous economic debates concerning the costs and benefits of pharmaceuticals, there has
not been an effort to summarize the policy progression. The second aim is to apply the agenda
setting and policy equilibrium literature to the area of pharmaceutical policy in order to
understand how positive and negative feedback shape the policy subsystem. As different
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dimensions of pharmaceutical regulation have taken center stage, I am interested in examining
how alternative coalitions have influenced the agenda setting process. The third, and final, aim
of this study is to generalize my findings to the broader understanding of agenda setting.
Thus, my research is motivated by three questions: (1) how has Congress governed the
pharmaceutical policy agenda over the post World War II era, (2) have periods of agenda access
led to venue changes in pharmaceutical regulation, (3) has the image of pharmaceutical policies
led to positive or negative feedback, and if so, what factors precipitated such change. The
results of this study are important because they highlight the institutional factors influencing the
cost and availability of prescription drugs. Moreover, this research provides insight concerning
federal involvement in regulatory policy.
The second chapter will focus on the agenda setting literature, specifically prior research
concerning punctuated equilibrium theory and punctuated equilibrium applications. The goal of
chapter two is to provide a synopsis of the most relevant literature and highlight the significance
of the current study. Chapter three provides a brief evolution of pharmaceutical policy in the
United States. Chapter four includes my tracking of the pharmaceutics agenda based on data
collected on bill introductions from 1947 to 2007 garnered from the Congressional Bills Project
and the Library of Congress’s THOMAS website. The bill’s sponsor, committee, referral
information, subject, and progress are provided in combination with an analysis including
descriptive charts and graphs. Chapter five assesses the dynamics of the pharmaceutics agenda
based on legislative hearings data collected from the Congressional Information Service Index to
Committee hearings and Abstracts to Committee Hearings. The overall pattern of these data will
reflect the issues that rise and fall from the political agenda. Finally, chapter six includes a
summary of my findings, the research contribution, and ideas for further analysis.
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2
Agenda Setting and Punctuated Equilibrium
There is no such thing as a fixed policy, because policy like all organic entities is always in the
making. - Attributed to Lord Salisbury
Agenda Setting
Any attempt to understand the course of public policy, must inevitably, consider why a
set of issues is addressed through policy while perhaps an equally important set of alternative
issues are not. The study of agenda setting is thus inherently “the study of social change and of
social stability” (Dearing and Rogers 1996, 2). Agenda setting can be conceptualized as the study
of issue salience—or the relative importance of an issue on the agenda. It is also the study of the
rise and fall of issue salience over a period of time (Soroka 2002, 5). During the agenda setting
stage of the policy process individuals and groups compete as they define their problem and
mobilize support for government attention to their issue (Ripley 1985, 51).
Specifically, an issue arises when a group perceives they have a problem that requires
governmental action, and there is public disagreement over the best solution to the perceived
problem (Eyestone 1978, 3). Problem definitions are constructed by policy actors who either
dramatize the policy alternatives in order to push an issue onto the agenda, or they downplay the
problem in an effort to encourage inaction (Rochefort and Cobb 1994, 3). In some instances, an
issue can be manufactured by those who manipulate the image of the issue for their own gain,
and sometimes, issues are generated by those who are simply interested in the public good (Cobb
and Elder 1972, 82-84). In either case, in order for the issue to be translated onto the decision
making agenda, “lobbyists, bureaucrats, elected politicians, and other political entrepreneurs
must be engaged to stoke the political fires” (Eyestone 1978, 2).
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Public policy scholars have developed a useful distinction between the systemic agenda
and the institutional agenda in order to clarify those issues that may receive attention by the
public, but have not yet moved onto the decision agenda of governmental officials. The systemic
agenda “consists of all issues that are commonly perceived by members of the political
community as meriting public attention” (Cobb and Elder 1972, 85). In essence, the systemic
agenda is the collective list of what the public considers ought to be done by government (Jones
1984, 58). Whereas, the institutional or governmental agenda is “that set of items explicitly up
for the active and serious consideration of authoritative decision makers” (Cobb and Elder 1972,
86). Contemporary “public policy analysts consider how and why governments enact and
implement policies to address public needs and demands” (Adolino and Blake 2001, 10).
Similarly, the current study is an analysis of the pharmaceutical public policies Congress has
enacted since World War II and a consideration of what actors and events, inside and outside of
government, have influenced their policy decisions.
As suggested by Kingdon, a logical distinction between the players of the agenda setting
process are those inside of government, including the administration, civil servants, and
Congress and those actors outside of government—interest groups, academics, media, and public
opinion (1995, 21). This simple, but effective method of explanation will be used to organize the
set of policy players relevant to the current study. This chapter will begin by discussing the
actors inside and outside of government, focusing on their relative impact on setting the
governmental agenda. I will then turn my attention to the role of subsystems and how these
subgovernments or issue networks work to restrict the number and variety of interests involved
in policymaking in a particular policy area. Finally, I will present the policy change models that
guide my theoretical perspective.

12

The Inside-Outside Distinction
Participants on the inside of government include the administration, civil servants, and
Congress. Although the administration can be thought of as the president, the staff in the
Executive Office, and the political appointees in departments and bureaus, I will focus my
attention on the ability of the president himself to affect the agenda and alternative issue
definitions. It probably comes as no surprise that the president can often dominate and even
determine the policy agenda, but he or she cannot dictate the alternatives that are considered
(Kingdon 1995). The president naturally commands public attention, due to the ability of the
president to veto and hire and fire. Thus, the position of the presidency comes with it authority
and status that bestow advantages in persuading other actors inside and outside of government
(Neustadt 1990). Despite these persuasive powers, presidents do face restrictions on their
internal resources (Light 1999, 6).
Paul Light finds that presidents are constrained in influencing the agenda by the internal
resources of time, information, expertise, and energy. In addition, Light finds external resources
such as, congressional support, public approval, and electoral margin all influence the presidents
ability to impact the domestic agenda (1999, 10). In our government of shared powers, a
president depends upon others whom he must persuade to act (Neustadt 1990, 31). For example,
despite President Kennedy’s personal interest and focus on civil rights in his 1961 domestic
agenda, Kennedy concluded that a major civil rights bill would not pass until a stronger majority
existed in Congress (Light 1999, 104). In short, the president can often place issues on the
policy agenda, but he or she can also be precluded from obtaining congressional action.
In contrast, career civil servants do not appear to be as influential in setting the agenda as
some scholars may assume (Kingdon 1995). Kingdon finds that careerists are more involved in
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the day to day management of government programs and are therefore, not involved in
advocating for new ideas or programs (1995, 31). Interestingly, despite their lack of
involvement in setting the agenda, career civil servants are participants in generating issue
alternatives. Their longevity, expertise, and relationships with people in Congress and interest
groups are valuable in formulating policy alternatives (Kingdon 1995, Golden 2000, Denhardt
and Grubbs 2003). The relationship “between these three actors—bureaucrats, committees, and
interest groups—is often called an iron triangle because their interests dovetail nicely because
they are alleged to be impenetrable from the outside and uncontrollable by president, political
appointees, or legislators not on the committees in question” (Kingdon 1995, 33).
Congress, the final participant on the inside of government, is a powerful institution and
holds a central place in the political system due to its oversight, policymaking, and advise-andconsent powers stipulated in the U.S. Constitution (Ahuja and Dewhirst 2003, 1). Congress, “in
contrast to most other actors, [has] the unusual ability to combine some impact on the agenda
with some control over the alternatives” due to its constitutional authority to act as a “primary
policy-maker” (Kingdon 1995, 35; Anderson 1997, 59). The committee and subcommittee
structure has enhanced the capacity of Congress to engage in policymaking. According to
Davidson and Oleszek, congressional committees within Congress serve two broad purposes,
individual and institutional (2004, 193).
Individually, committees within Congress allow members to advertise (be perceived in a
positive light), gain expertise, and secure reelection—due to credit claiming (Davidson and
Oleszek 2004; Mayhew 2004; Rohde 2005). Institutionally, committees allow members to
control the policy issues of most concern to their districts, garnering power, and creating good
public policy (Davidson and Oleszek 2004, 193; Mayhew 1974). Undoubtedly, committees are
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“one of the most important institutional structures through which members pursue their goals”
(Rohde 2005, 207). Committee boundaries are made based on the interaction between policy
entrepreneurs and the House and Senate parliamentarians. King identifies two types of
committee jurisdictions – statutory and common law. Statutory jurisdictions are “coded into the
House or Senate written rules,” whereas, common law jurisdictions are determined when
jurisdictionally ambiguous bills are referred to a committee within 24 hours of introduction
(King 1997, 34, 37).
Common law jurisdictions are where the turf wars are fought, “as new issues arise, the
parliamentarians of the House and Senate make decisions about where bills relating to them
should be referred, and those initial referrals tend to govern future ones.” Baumgartner and
Jones assert that the hearings process allows committees to invest resources as a “means of
claiming future jurisdiction so that new bills will be referred to a given committee” (1993, 200).
Policy entrepreneurs, those who facilitate the issue translation process, carefully craft their plan
to move into unchartered territory, because if the bill is too far from their committee’s statutory
expertise they may lose the battle permanently (King 1997, 40-41; Eyestone 1978, 88). Policy
entrepreneurs actively present bills for referral that are related to their committees’ jurisdiction in
the hope that the amended law will not find a host law in the original committee; thereby
establishing a foundation for future control of similar issues, establishing a “common law
jurisdiction” (King 1997, 8).

King suggests that formal jurisdictions are codified by this type of

evolution (King 1997; Rohde 2005). In short, Congress is able to influence the agenda not only
by its broad statutory powers, but by its jurisdictional battles as well.
Participants without formal statutory positions can also influence the agenda and the
policy alternatives. These outside participants include interest groups, media, the mass public,
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and academics, as well as others, such as consultants and researchers. Baumgartner and Jones
note that how various interests are organized and mobilized for political action influences policy
change (1993, 175). Interest group activity in particular does influence the agenda and agenda
alternatives, in varying degrees. Interest groups consist of business and industry, professional,
labor, public interest groups, and government officials as lobbyists (Kingdon 1995, 47; Olson
1971). The influence of each type of interest group is contingent on the ideology of the group,
the importance of the interest group, and the visibility of the policy issue. As recognized by
Baumgartner and Jones, interest groups can structure the choices available to policymakers and
the way the public perceives or understands the policy debate (1993, 190).
Policy communities spring up around numerous public policy issues, attaching their
preferred policy alternatives to the debate—sometimes their policy definitions have already been
made prominent by other groups or entrepreneurs (Kingdon 1995, 50). For example, in the
United States, AIDS and Cancer disease-based interest groups have had a significant impact on
the legislation and regulation of pharmaceutical policy for many years (Daemmrich 2004). The
influence of disease-based interest groups, such as those focusing on AIDS and Cancer patient
access to pharmaceuticals, has been achieved by their ability to exhibit a united front and to
control internal conflict. But, despite the influence of disease based interest groups in
pharmaceutical policy, it is important to note that even well organized, cohesive interests groups
will be defeated on occasion. In short, interest groups are effective in framing alternative
problem definitions, but responsibility for the emergence of agenda items cannot be solely
credited to them or their activities.
The final participants on the outside of government—media and the mass public—often
interact to influence the systemic and the governmental agenda. As noted by Kingdon, the
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public’s attention to governmental issues often follow the topics reported on by the media, which
in turn, is considered by vote-seeking politicians (1995, 57, 65). This media-policy change
process is often the normative view of how public opinion and the media interact to influence
policy change. According to Stimson et al., “most political decisions are about change or the
prevention of change….Thus, when public policy drifts away from the public’s demands for
policy, the representation system acts as a control mechanism [or thermostat] to keep policy on
course” (1995, 543-44). But, this process has been challenged.
Cook et al. conducted an experimental design around a single media event in order to
explore the impact of the media on the general public, policy makers, interest group leaders, and
public policy. They found that the media event did influence the views about issue importance
among the general public and government policy makers, but the change in public opinion was
not found to lead to policy change. Cook et al. suggest the subsequent policy change following
the media event was a result of collaboration between journalists and high-level subcommittee
staff members (1983, 31-32).
However, attention to a particular policy area can become heightened due to media
priming, where media attention to an issue causes people to place emphasis on a particular topic
(Miller and Krosnick 2000). According to Miller and Krosnick, agenda setting “occurs when
extensive media attention to an issue increases its perceived national importance” (2000, 301;
McCombs and Shaw 1972). Readers recognize newspaper and television stories receive
attention because the editors consider them to be important topics even without explicit
statements suggesting their relevance to the nation (Iyengar and Kinder 1987; Miller and
Krosnick 2000). Therefore, news coverage may influence citizens’ perception concerning the
importance of a policy issue. Thus, public opinion tends to influence the agenda more than the
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alternatives (Kingdon 1995; Rogers and Dearing 1996; Stimson et al. 1995). As previously
discussed, actors on the inside and outside of government form relationships in an effort to
influence the agenda—including policy alternatives. In order to further understand the dynamics
involved in the agenda setting process, the following section describes the influence of
subsystem politics and the policy change or stability that occurs as a result of such dynamics.
Subsystem Dynamics and Policy Change
Policy subsystems, also known as policy networks, advocacy coalitions and policy
communities are structural arrangements supported by powerful ideas, with patterns of
interactions of participants or actors involved in making decisions in special areas of public
policy—formed by an executive bureau and congressional committees, with special interest
groups intimately attached (Baumgartner and Jones 1993, 3; Freeman 1965, 11; McCool 1998,
552). Policy subsystems may want to broaden the issue definition of a policy or contract it,
depending on their goals. Thus, emotional symbols or complicated terms may be utilized
(Baumgartner and Jones 1993). Therefore, issue definitions, institutional arrangements, and
venue access create the opportunity for subsystem arrangements to be broken up or maintained.
A number of scholars have developed subsystem typologies in order to provide an
understanding of the environment where subsystems operate. James Thurber distinguished
among dominant, competitive, and disintegrated subsystems. The aforementioned systems are
based on the type of policy, issue, and event facing the subsystem actors. “Although the most
comfortable state of a policy subsystem is closed, static, and dominant over a particular program,
competition and even policy disintegration occurs in any policy area from time to time” (Thurber
1991, 327). According to Thurber’s typology, dominant policy subsystems are relatively stable

18

and consist of a small number of participants; as such, these subsystems are usually distributive
in nature, and combat those who seek to intrude on their autonomy (1991, 327).
Competitive subsystems, those most closely associated with regulatory or redistributive
policies are more open and the relationships among the subsystem players are unstable.
Competition can often be a result of a redefinition of the issue or by attacks from outside actors
(Thurber 1991, 330). Multiple legislative referrals tend to be indicative of a competitive
subsystem and competition also results from external events that challenge the subsystem power
brokers. Finally, disintegrated policy subsystems experience extensive conflict often resulting in
jurisdictional change. The impact and nature of subsystem change is influenced by the scope and
level of conflict. In essence, competition among subsystems can lead to intervention from
outside interests or increase the visibility of the issue, leading to a higher volume of interested
players.
Daniel McCool (1998) further develops a subsystem typology based on conflict control
and behavior, specifically focusing on functional behaviors. McCool suggests the principal goal
of subsystems is to control conflict with little political liability; therefore, each type of subsystem
has a conflict preference. Based on this theory, a preference hierarchy is developed in order to
identify four types of subsystems. The hierarchy of conflict includes, exclusionary politics,
which occurs when the subsystem effectively excludes potential opponents. Second, cooptation
through allocation also occurs when the opponent or opponents are too powerful to exclude;
therefore, opponents are influenced or “bought” by sharing subsystem benefits. Third, turf
balkanization occurs when two subsystems control various aspects of the policy area. Thus, the
two subsystems co-exist, even if tenuously. Finally, there is competitive confrontation, which as
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inferred, exists when there is active conflict among subsystems. Subsystem competitiveness and
zero-sum largess influence movement from one level in the hierarchy to another.
Worsham (1998) developed a wavering equilibrium theory of subsystem politics to
distinguish between three types of subsystems. His approach offers a more parsimonious and
empirically useful typology by moving “beyond the traditional dichotomy of iron triangle vs.
issue network” (McCool 1998, 557). Worsham’s dominant, transitory, and competing coalitions
typology demonstrates how a subsystem’s ability to control the policy agenda varies with a
change in subsystem politics (1998, 486). As a first step in tracking subsystem political
variation, Worsham conducted a subject search of the Congressional Information Service, U.S.
Congress and Committee Hearing Index to locate the relevant hearings dealing with civilian
development of nuclear power, forestry policy, and Indian policy. Next, participation profiles
for each two year session of congress were constructed based on a review of the abstracts of all
hearings. Finally, concentration ratios were constructed by adding the number of interests
appearing at hearings during a particular Congress and then dividing the total by the number of
witnesses. In essence, he finds subsystems experience cycles over time, which then influence
interest group participation, agenda control, and public policy (Worsham 1998, 508).
A second trend in agenda setting process studies examines subsystem change over time.
The subsystem change studies provide the research design and methodological structure for the
current study. Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith suggest policy change over time is a function of three
sets of processes, including competing advocacy coalitions within a policy subsystem, changes
external to the subsystem, and stable system parameters (1993, 5). Advocacy coalitions, which
are individuals from various backgrounds who share a set of beliefs, are the major focus for
understanding change.
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Within the ACF framework public policies and programs are thought to exhibit
characteristics similar to belief systems. The assumption is based on the premise that public
policies and programs are ushered in with implicit theories concerning their objectives. Thus,
the belief systems of advocacy coalitions involve value priorities, perceptions of causal
relationships, and perceptions of effective policy instruments, among other beliefs. Through
internal feedback loops advocacy coalitions experience policy-oriented learning. They try to
better understand the external world around them, but they will resist information not in line with
their beliefs (Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith 1993, 19).
The ACF framework distinguishes between those parameters that are relatively stable
over time and those that are susceptible to significant change. Relatively stable parameters
include: (1) the basic attributes of the problem area, (2) the basic distribution of natural
resources, (3) fundamental cultural values and social structure, and the basic legal structure.
Stable parameters constrain subsystem actors. Dynamic system events, on the other hand, can
offer constraints or opportunities: (1) socioeconomic conditions and technology, (2) systemic
governing coalitions or “critical elections,” (3) and policy decisions and impacts from other
subsystems. In short, policy change over time is a function of the advocacy coalition’s response
to learning, external events, and threats to the core beliefs of the subsystem (McCool 1998, 557).
An illustration of policy change due to external events and threats to the subsystem is
evident in the construction and collapse of the nuclear policy monopoly studied by Baumgartner
and Jones (1993). Baumgartner and Jones show a historically powerful monopoly existed in the
1940’s and 50’s, which framed how nuclear power was defined and effectively shut out
competitive visions (i.e. regulatory agencies, atomic energy commission, congressional
committees, state public utility commissions, federal and state courts, the mass media, private
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investors, and the broader public) (Baumgartner and Jones 1993, 60). Images of protecting the
country and maintaining an industrial edge, as well as additional positive uses of nuclear power
assisted in constructing the policy monopoly—effectively linking image and venue.
As a measure of attention and tone, Baumgartner and Jones utilized previously coded
positive and negative titles listed in the Readers’ Guide to Periodical Literature for military and
civilian uses of nuclear power (1993, 64). Based on the number of articles on civilian nuclear
power and the percentage of articles coded positive, they conclude the nuclear power issue
emerged once again on the public agenda during the 1960’s and 70’s. In 1968 the image became
negative, as evidenced by the dominance of negative titles. The very image used to strengthen
support for nuclear policies now began to undermine earlier successes. Segments of the media
and previously uninterested parties became active and institutions that were favorable became
opponents.
Government agencies had been created and organized to encourage the private sector to
research and utilize nuclear options. In addition, special joint committees of Congress were also
influential (Baumgartner and Jones 1993, 66). Negative images began to emerge after the issue
definition or policy image was expanded to include previously neglected definitions. Policy
venues began to open and the combination of changing policy image and institutions resulted in
the destruction of the closed nuclear policy subsystem. The regulatory environment experienced
an increase in oversight, as exhibited by Atomic Energy Commission (AEC) annual reports, the
number of reactor inspections performed by the AEC, and the increase in Inspection and
Enforcement Division staff.
In combination with increasing regulatory oversight, congressional activities also began
to change. Based on a coding of all nuclear power hearings from 1945 to 1987 few committees
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held hearings (an average of three per year) from 1945 to 1954. But during the period 1969 to
1986, 51 hearings per year were held. The increase in hearings were accompanied by more
committees and subcommittees claiming jurisdiction over nuclear policy. Nuclear power
opponents were thus able to penetrate the powerful subsystem by utilizing regulatory rules and
participating in jurisdictional claims.
Valerie Hunt (2002) also explores the interplay between issue redefinition efforts and the
congressional committee system. She examines congressional immigration activity in both
chambers in order to observe when and how policy activity shifts to influence long-term policy
change. Specifically, Hunt traces the influence of committee entrepreneurial activity on shifts in
issue definition and agenda change. These dynamics are examined within and across
institutions, because political entrepreneurs often shop a current issue in order to locate the most
favorable venue. She utilizes data drawn from The Policy Agendas Project database, which “is a
series of comprehensive data sets of U.S. Congressional hearings, public laws, Congressional
Quarterly Almanac stories, and selected stories from the New York Times spanning over fortyfive years of policy making in the United States” (Hunt 2002, 79). Keyword searches and the
Policy Agendas Project topic-coding scheme were used in combination with qualitative
immigration reform and statute data.
First, Hunt examined the level and intensity of hearing activity in both chambers in order
to discern redefinition efforts by policy entrepreneurs and to track subcommittee jurisdiction
changes. Second, she compared the level and intensity of legislative output to hearings activity.
As an indicator of importance, public statutes were weighted by the amount of news coverage
received in the Congressional Quarterly Almanac. Following an examination of issue
redefinition efforts in hearings activity, Hunt concluded the multidimensional nature of U.S.
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immigration policy created opportunities for policy punctuations (2002, 93). In addition,
subissues and new emergent issues created opportunities for competing policy venues to
challenge the dominant subsystem. Thus, as proposed by the punctuated equilibrium theory –
the interplay of issues and venues lead to changes in policy outputs and policy venues.
John Hardin (2002) also relies on the punctuated equilibrium theory to examine how
committee jurisdictions have changed over time and influenced the use of committee
information. He utilized the area of health care reform to buttress his positive feedback study.
Hardin notes how previous studies have acted as if institutions were exogenous to the policy
process by assuming committees remain static, hold monopolistic control, and define the
committee function (2002, 96). In order to explore the policy process in addition to the
congressional structure, Hardin asserts three dimensions influence the nature and extent of
information acquired at committee hearings. The topic of the hearing, the target group(s)
providing the context of the hearing, and the type of witnesses testifying at the hearing.
Information obtained along these three dimensions can differ greatly in each committee;
therefore, (1) how many committees acquire information about the stated issue at any given time
and (2) the nature and extent of the information committees acquire along each of the three
dimensions was empirically examined (Hardin 2002, 100).
Hardin’s analysis focused on five factors pertaining to each of the hearings from 1947 to
1993: (1) the committee holding the hearing, (2) the type of hearing, (3) the specific topic(s) of
the hearing, (4) the target groups(s) of the hearing, and (5) the interest affiliation of witnesses
testifying at the hearing (2002, 101). He utilized the Policy Agendas Project congressional
hearings data set. In combination with the available variables, he addressed the specific topics of
the hearing, and the target groups of hearings or witnesses testifying at hearings by reading
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summaries of each hearing in the Congressional Information Service Abstracts (CIS) and using
an extensive coding procedure (2002, 101).
His analysis showed between 1947 and 1970, a small number of committees held
hearings on health care reform and they received most of their information from health care
providers. Beginning in the 1970’s various committees began to hold hearings, but the range of
witnesses decreased. Further, three topics were the main focus of the hearings. In the 1980’s
and early 1990’s the number and variety of committees holding hearings increased yet again.
Herfindahl indexes were constructed to measure the jurisdictional overlap and Hardin found
overlap increased for both types of hearings over time. Simultaneous and consistent increases in
attention by various groups to health care reform themes were evident. He suggested the
“patterns appear to reflect an overarching positive feedback process,” due to the increased
attention of Congress as measured by hearing activity (Hardin 2002, 120). Specifically, these
findings link issues and institutions, and highlight the benefits of longitudinal analysis (Hardin
2002, 121).
Wilkerson, et al. (2002) take on the examination of bills and hearings in order to trace
attention in Congress, they too utilize health care legislation. Special attention is given to the
policy window concept, where policy images change and thus encourages new participants in the
policy area. They highlight the difficulty of quantitatively studying policy windows, but
conclude the effects of opening windows can be systematically studied (2002, 251). Due to the
multidimensional nature of health care policy, it is an excellent arena to examine policy
windows; a specific example is the enactment of Medicare (Wilkerson 2002, 252). According to
Wilkerson et al., “the Democratic landslide election of 1964 and President Johnson’s Great
society program provided the policy window” (2002, 253). Despite the occurrence of a policy
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window, external events can encourage or stymie policy outcomes. The lack of national health
care reform appears to be a result of these external events.
Wilkerson et al., provide an example of how bill introductions can be used to trace policy
dynamics. Hearings are often held to stake claim to a jurisdiction or to show support of an issue,
but as suggested by Baumgartner and Jones (2005), institutions suffer from the same bottleneck
of attention as individuals; therefore, Congress must set priorities. The approach utilized by
Wilkerson et al., compares bill activity in catastrophic health care coverage to committee
hearings activity. They use data on the introduction of bills and hearings over twenty years to
illustrate the process of policy windows. Specifically, congressional bill introductions
concerning catastrophic health care costs from 1973 to 1998 were analyzed.
The bill introductions were obtained by using the Library of Congress’s THOMAS
website to search for bills containing key words (Wilkerson et al. 2002, 260). Wilkerson et al.
note this search approach can produce problems of over or under sampling, but suggest these
limitations are less problematic if the interest is in relative interest. In order to account for the
aforementioned limitations, bills clearly not health related were eliminated. Based on their
analysis, interest in catastrophic health coverage has varied over time and across chambers with
the House exhibiting more activity than the Senate (2002, 260).
In order to compare bill activity with hearings activity Wilkerson et al. examined
hearings abstracts in the Policy Agendas Project database. Initially, they identified all hearings
related to issues of patient costs and coverage in the Medicare program, but due to the over and
under sampling limitations and to make bill activity and hearings activity more comparable they
reported differences from average levels of activity across the entire time period. Two
punctuations in hearings activity occurred—first, from 1979-1980 when hearings activity

26

increased but without an increase in bill introductions. And second, in the 100th Congress when
hearings activity and bill introductions spiked. They state, after a period of softening up, a
“series of exogenous events produced rapid increase in interest culminating in a major policy
change” – the Medicare Catastrophic Coverage Act (2002, 262). Although, the Act was
repealed because Medicare recipients objected to paying for the new benefit (Wilkerson et al.
2002, 263).
By comparing catastrophic bill activity to bill activity on long-term care services and
long-term care insurance, Wilkerson et al. find evidence of a spillover effect. A spillover effect
is when a window for one subject opens or increases and therefore the probability of a window
opening for another policy increases (Wilkerson et al. 2002, 262). The authors show how
constituency backlash negatively affected efforts to provide catastrophic health care coverage.
Suggesting, policy entrepreneurs must have an arsenal of viable solutions in order to take
advantage of various policy windows when they arrive.
Results from the subsystem typology and policy change research, make it apparent
conflict and competition affect the stability of a subsystem. Multiple legislative referrals and
external events often challenge subsystem power brokers and can result in a competitive
subsystem. The power brokers then seek to control the conflict based on their conflict
preferences, but the ability to control the policy agenda varies with a change in subsystem
politics. In order to effectively hash out the dynamics of these policy changes, the subsystem
must be reviewed over a decade or more to allow for at least one cycle of formulation,
implementation, and evaluation.
Previous theories of pluralism have emphasized policy incrementalism, but due to insight
provided by the policy typology and change research, it is apparent many policy areas experience
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long periods of stability with short bursts of change (Baumgartner and Jones 1991, 1044). I seek
to understand the dynamic governing the evolution of pharmaceutical policy, and drug
importation in particular, as a case study in how positive and negative feedback shape policy
subsystems. Specifically, this research examines how Congress governs the multidimensional
nature of pharmaceutical policy, including prescription drug importation. The following section
details the theoretical perspective underlying this analysis.
Punctuated Equilibrium and Subsystems
In an attempt to understand the nature of the pharmaceutical policy domain and the
difficulty in altering the existing policy equilibrium, a promising line of inquiry is the
examination of the interplay of positive and negative feedback mechanisms in the maintenance
of institutionally induced policy equilibria (Baumgartner and Jones 1991, 1993, 2002).
Punctuated equilibrium theory seeks to explain not only the partial equilibrium or incremental
norm of American politics, but also the large-scale disruptions (True et. al., policyagendas.org,
155).
Policy equilibrium occurs when institutional arrangements allow individuals to satisfy
their desires. Therefore, in order to understand disequilibria, or policy change, we must
understand how institutions satisfy individuals, as well as how individuals alter arrangements to
pursue their desires. Thus, any examination of the course of public policy must consider the role
of issue definitions, institutional arrangements, and venue access (Jones 2001; Stores and
Worsham 2008; Worsham 1998). According to the punctuated equilibrium theory, stability and
change are a result of the same institutional system and rules. As issues are defined in public
discourse they rise and fall in the public agenda, which can lead to reinforcement of existing
policies (negative feedback) or policy redefinitions can lead to the questioning of policies at the

28

most fundamental levels—creating opportunities for major reversals in policy outcomes (positive
feedback) (True et. al., policyagendas.org, 156; Baumgartner and Jones 1991, 1993, 2002).
Instead of equilibrium balancing public preferences and public policies through a
combination of elections (social theory) and the open struggle of interest groups (group theory),
stability is enforced through a complex system of mutually non-interfering policy monopolies
(Baumgartner and Jones 1993). Partial equilibria is therefore maintained through the allocation
of governmental elite attention and apathy from others who are not interested in the policy area
or issues (Baumgartner and Jones 1993, 18). Thus, although punctuations are possible, the policy
system is stable in the way it processes information or ideas. The presence of policy
equilibriums suggest that policy monopolies effectively limit access to the political process.
Negative feedback models are thus characterized by shocks in the system being resisted,
which eventually settles back to the status quo. Furthermore, negative feedback is an indicator
that institutional arrangements are allowing groups to achieve their desires (Baumgartner and
Jones 1991, 1993, 2002, Worsham 1998). The subsystem creates barriers to policy participation
by restricting the number of interests involved in a particular policy area. Therefore, if
congressional committees fail to represent the interests of a particular group, then policy
problems related to that group may be displaced (Baumgartner and Jones, 1993). In short, the
presence of limited access in the pharmaceutical policy domain could realistically lead to less
than optimal drug policy, as ideas and interests that challenge the status quo are displaced.
On the other hand, positive feedback occurs when shocks or changes introduced into the
system lead to a new point of stability. Typically, a system experiencing equilibrium will not
change significantly, and when a force does push the system away from its stable point, it will
move back to equilibrium over time (Baumgartner and Jones 1993). If a system is not in a state
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of equilibrium, minor shifts in inputs can lead to dramatic, cascading changes in policy outputs
(Baumgartner and Jones 1993, 16). According to Kingdon, success in one policy area can lead
to a spillover process, as politicians and winning coalitions transfer the formula to a similar area
in hopes of continued success (Kingdon 1995, 203).
The agenda therefore experiences periods of volatility, even while the policy alternatives
remain relatively stable. Thus, policymaking experiences periods of structure induced
equilibrium and punctuated change. When new issues emerge on the agenda new institutional
structures are often created and remain for a decade or more if the general principles of the
current policy are not challenged. However, when a new principle or issue definition is
considered, agenda access can destroy the previous institutional structure. Therefore, studying
change in committee control of policy jurisdiction is central to studying policy subsystems to
determine the variant of subsystem politics in play and what interests are represented (Stores and
Worsham 2008; Worsham 1998).
Thus, my study continues the line of work already established by Baumgartner and Jones
(1993), McCool (1990), Thurber (1991) and Worsham (1998, 2006). In addition to
understanding the alteration, if any, of the pharmaceutical subsystem, the interaction between
issue definition and congressional venue are examined in order to assess how prescription drug
importation has emerged and evolved on the governmental agenda. Several scholars have
focused on the economic merits for and against importation, but a systemic agenda-setting
account has not been conducted. The question thus becomes how the multidimensional nature of
prescription drug policy and the congressional committee system interact to allow the various
dimensions to gain agenda access in different committees within Congress.
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Based on the proposed theory, I expect to find periods of punctuations due to cue taking
or mimicking characterized by negative feedback as shocks to the system and actions of policy
entrepreneurs influence the agenda setting of pharmaceutical policy. In addition, as the subject
matter of legislation introduced varies, I expect to see signs of increased competition due partly
to the activities of policy entrepreneurs. The next chapter will provide a history of key
pharmaceutical regulation in the United States as the first step in examining the ideas, interests,
and institutions entrenched in the pharmaceutical policy domain.
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Pharmaceutical Regulation in the United States: An Institutional History
“Drug regulation is a complex system in which physicians, government regulators, the
pharmaceutical industry, and disease-based organizations fight about or, less frequently,
collaborate on clinical trials, approval decisions, and the monitoring of side effects.”
Daemmrich 2004, X
The pharmaceutical policy subsystem is founded on relationships fostered among
congressional actors, regulatory agencies, the pharmaceutical industry, the medical profession,
disease-based organizations, and consumers. The historical evolution of the pharmacy subsystem
is a textbook example of how an institutionally induced equilibrium works to foster a policy
monopoly and at the same time illustrates how punctuating events upset such relationships.
Given the diversity of interests that are active in the policy domain, the prescription drug
subsystem is marked by intense periods of competition and conflict. The result is that U.S. drug
policy has experienced regular and significant renegotiation of authority among the key players
in medical policy (Wood 1986; Daemmrich 2004). So, for example, as the Food and Drug
Administration (FDA) expanded its authority, physician authority to represent the patient was
weakened. Similarly, when disease-based interest groups became major players, they worked to
usurp regulatory and or physician authority to set policy. Quite simply, group-based efforts to set
the agenda quite often move another group’s concerns off the stage. In the end, it is the
competition and conflict among the various participants that sets the theme for the
pharmaceutical policy realm.
As will be illustrated throughout this chapter, the role of policy entrepreneurs is essential
to altering the dominant image (and reigning policy) associated with pharmaceutical regulation.
Conflicts over the meaning of information leads to subsystem challenges as groups try to extend
or preserve their authority to determine policy. In examining the issue salience of prescription
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drug regulation and its rise and fall on the systemic and institutional agenda, my intention is not
to provide an exhaustive historical account (see Bailey 1930; Anderson 1958; Temin 1980;
Wood 1986, Young 1989 for such efforts), but rather an analysis of how the multidimensional
nature of prescription drug policy and the congressional committee system have interacted to
allow various dimensions of the issue to gain a foothold on the agenda at a particular moment in
time.
Grabowski and Vernon (1983) have characterized three distinctive periods in the history
of American drug regulation, an approach I adopt in this chapter. The period 1906-1937 was an
era that concentrated on preventing misbranding and adulteration of drugs. Therefore, I refer to
this era as the era of patent medicine correction. The patent medicine correction period is
characterized by a predominantly market-oriented approach to drug regulation that sought to
correct market failure by preventing misbranding and adulteration of drugs, using the 1906 Pure
Food and Drug Act and subsequent amendments in 1912 as a guide (Ceccoli 2003, 166; 2004;
Grabowski and Vernon 1983, 2).
The second major period, 1938-1961, is characterized by a mix of market mechanisms
and centralized control on the part of the FDA (Ceccoli 2003; 2004). The 1938 Food, Drug, and
Cosmetic Act sought to remedy some of the weaknesses in the 1906 Act by expanding regulation
and requiring pre-market proof of safety by manufacturers.
The third major period, 1962-1991, ushered in an era of even more stringent centralized
controls. Following the passage of the 1962 Kefauver Amendments pharmaceutical
manufacturers were required to receive regulatory approval prior to clinical testing and to prove
drug safety and efficacy prior to marketing the drug (Ceccoli 2003; Grabowski and Vernon 1983;
Jackson 1970).
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Ceccoli (2003, 167; 2004) suggests a fourth period of drug regulation beginning in 1992,
when the FDA rebalanced their risk-benefit analysis with an emphasis on making new drugs
available sooner through the Prescription Drug User Fee Act. As the FDA began to broaden
their interpretation of consumer protection, centralized controls gave way to a period that
focused on accommodating public access to new pharmaceuticals.
Finally, it appears we are in the midst of a fifth period, marked by the passage of the
Medicare Modernization Act in 2003. The fundamental philosophy of the current period is
characterized by expanded entitlements and renewed attention to safety concerns.
In this chapter, I examine the five periods of American drug regulation, highlighting the
key pharmaceutical policies enacted in each period, as well as the institutions, actors, and events
that led to the enactment of these policies. As will be seen, drug policy is a result of balancing
the competing, and often contradictory, needs of the major players in the subsystem, with the
desire to serve the public interest for access to safe and effective prescription drugs.
1906 – 1937: Patent Medicine Correction
The first period of drug regulation was ushered in by the policy entrepreneurship of
Harvey Wiley, known as the “Crusading Chemist.” Wiley, director of the Division of Chemistry
(the precursor to the FDA), was interested in protecting the consumer from wide spread
misbranding of pharmaceuticals, and expanding the jurisdiction of his bureau. Following a
twenty-year campaign for a national pure food and drug law, Wiley and the USDA were well
known among Congress, women’s groups, and business organizations for their analytical
expertise. By establishing multiple networks, the department avoided catering to one set of
Progressive interests, an approach Wiley used to engage in coalition building (Carpenter 2001,
256). Despite opposition from Republican Congresses in the late 1890s and early 1900s, Wiley
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and his coalition of more than 100 organizations spurred Theodore Roosevelt and Congress to
action with the passage of the 1906 Pure Food and Drugs Act (PFDA) (Carpenter 2001, 2). The
PFDA attempted to prevent misbranding and adulteration of drugs and its passage also
established an institutional legacy for what would become the Food and Drug Administration.
While my account of pharmaceutical regulation takes the 1906 Pure Food and Drugs Act
as its starting point, regulation of pharmaceuticals was a topic of discussion during the latter half
of the 19th century. Between roughly the end of the Civil War and the turn of the century, more
than 100 food and drug bills were introduced in Congress. All eventually died in committee, due
in part to the lack of sustained public concern, as well as questions regarding the constitutional
authority of Congress to regulate commerce (Temin 1980, 28). Between 1879 and 1882 several
general anti-adulteration bills were introduced in Congress, two substitutes were reported
favorably in the House, but none became law (Anderson 1958, 70). Instead, anti-adulteration
laws were state level creations, which led to difficulties when it came to enforcement across state
lines. As the economy became increasingly national, at least some commercial interests agreed
that national regulation was needed. To be sure, not all business interests supported a national
pure food and drug law—their support or opposition was based on how the law would influence
their profits (Wood 1986, 109). Enter Harvey Wiley.
Harvey Washington Wiley began work with the Chemistry Division of the Department of
Agriculture in 1883 (Carpenter 2001, 201). He came to the department after teaching nine years
at Purdue University where he had established himself as an expert in the analysis of sugar
(Carpenter 2001). The agricultural economy of the late 1800s was volatile and Wiley’s sugar
expertise spurred him to build alliances with the Louisiana Sugar Producers’ Association, a
powerful actor in Democratic politics, as well as Gulf State farmers (Carpenter 2001). Although
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Wiley achieved limited success in campaigning to expand sugar production, due to costly
technology, he had built a strong alliance among planters, investors, state chemists and college
officials. Following the stagnated sugar campaign, Wiley took up an interest in pure food in an
effort to expand the role of the Chemistry Division.
Wiley, acting as a policy entrepreneur, worked to secure support for national level
regulation by working with the Association of Official Agricultural Chemists, the National
Board of Trade, Farm Journal Editors, and the Senate Agriculture Committee, under Algernon S.
Paddock (R-NE). For example, the National Board of Trade (NBT), an organization of civic
trade groups and chambers of commerce, helped to promote state-level campaigns. New York,
New Jersey, and Massachusetts established state health boards, but state level activity declined
following their establishment. Nonetheless, state chemists had become empowered to establish
and enforce health standards. Further, the NBT also endorsed and had several bills introduced in
Congress in the 1880s. None passed due to the inability of the various conflicting interests to
find some middle ground (Anderson 1958).
In 1883 Dr. Harvey Wiley, known as the “Father of the Pure Food and Drugs Act,”
became chief chemist of the Division of Chemistry and expanded the Bureau of Chemistry’s
food adulteration studies (Anderson 1958; FDA 1999). Working with Algernon S. Paddock (RNE), chair of the Senate Agriculture and Forestry Committee, he fashioned a bill that was the
direct predecessor of the Pure Food and Drugs Act. It passed the Senate but died in the House
due to opposition from cottonseed oil producers, and other manufacturers who were afraid their
industries would be affected negatively by the legislation (Anderson 1958, 80).
Because the more direct legislative route proved impossible, Paddock worked within
established channels to encourage Wiley’s entrepreneurship. The result was a Bureau of
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Chemistry study that focused on the health effects of chemical preservatives and coloration.
Wiley’s food adulteration studies and his “Poison Squad,” aided by additional events, drew
attention and support for a federal food and drug law (Carpenter 2001). In the words of James
Harvey Young (1989, 4) the period leading up to the passage of the Pure Food and Drugs Act
was characterized by “change, complexity, competition, crusading, coalescence, compromise,
and catastrophe.”
Change originated from the research revolution—scientific discovery during the last
third of the nineteenth century resulted in new technology for identifying adulterants. The new
technology allowed scientists to narrow down the number and type of adulterants present in
various food, drink, and drugs. In addition to industry changes, the legislative process became
complex due to the omnibus food, drink, and drug bills in Congress. Producing and processing
units were located in essentially every congressional district, which led to a large number of
interest groups becoming involved (Anderson 1958; Young 1989).
Competition further complicated the omnibus bills in Congress, because less reputable
food, drink, and drug makers drove down market prices with their cheap goods, which led nonadulterating processors to seek assistance through Congress. Farmers, in addition to industry
producers, also complained as oleomargarine, a new invention from France, threatened the butter
market. Single subject legislative bills, such as the drug import and oleomargarine act, were
successful because they received support from influential interest groups, physicians,
pharmacists, and dairy farmers who attempted to protect their competitive interests (Young 1989,
5).
Wiley, seeing an opening despite the seeming policy chaos, made adulteration studies the
cornerstone of the Division of Chemistry in the Department of Agriculture (Young 1989, 5). He
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was able to bring together business, state agricultural chemists, state and local government
associations, physicians, women’s club members, and journalists—key economic, political, and
social organizations of the Progressive Period because of the common concern with adulteration.
As a successful political entrepreneur he was able to join these previous conflicting interests into
an effective coalition that raised public awareness and pressured legislators to consider
adulteration of food, drink, and drugs a regulatory responsibility of the federal government
(Anderson 1958; Young 1989, 5; Temin 1980).
Wiley’s numerous affiliations would end up being a requirement for passage of the 1906
act. Adulteration was placed on the public agenda by 1898 as a result of the National Food and
Drug Congress. The congress, which met in Washington, DC that year, included representatives
from state and federal government along with “trade, manufacturing, agricultural, scientific, and
medical associations” intent on formulating national level regulation (Anderson 1958, 124;
Carpenter 2001, 260). Due to the efforts of the congress, the National Grange, the Farmers’
National Congress, wholesale grocers, the health officer of the District of Columbia, and the
editor of the Washington Post all joined the call for a federal food law (Anderson 1958, 124).
The 1898 Congress was the first national gathering to bring attention to the misbranding and
adulteration of both food and drugs. Harvey Wiley delivered the central address to the Pure Food
Congress, which focused on adulteration in scientific terms. Given the prevalent belief in the
“invisible hand” of the market, Wiley was careful to express his opposition to any prohibition to
the manufacturing of goods—he only wanted protection from deception for the innocent
consumer (Anderson 1958; Wood 1986, 51).
The argument was focused on the importance of honesty in the market, but did not
challenge the free-market ideals of the Progressive Period. Manufacturers managed to secure
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exclusions for disclosing their trade formulas, the National Confectioners’ Association secured a
special definition of adulterated candy, and trade interests lobbied to narrow the definition of
drugs “to include only cosmetics and products recognized as medicines in the United States
Pharmacopoeia and the National Formulary”—thus excluding proprietary or patent drugs
(Anderson 1958, 125). Wiley convinced the National Food and Drug Congress (NFDC) to
endorse a regulatory measure written by the Association of Official Agricultural Chemists
(AOAC). From 1898 to 1900 Wiley succeeded in encouraging Representative Marriott Brosius
of Pennsylvania and others to introduce several bills based on the AOAC measure (Anderson
1958; Carpenter 2001, 261). None passed.
The National Food and Drug Congress met twice more, once in 1899 and once in 1900,
in order to raise awareness regarding the anti-adulteration movement, but in 1900 the congress
moved toward reducing the Chemistry Divisions power. Wiley lost interest and the institution
eventually dissolved (Carpenter 2001, 262). Although the NFDC dissolved, the networks and
coalitions forged during its development linked together farm organizations, the Women’s
Christian Temperance Union, civic leagues and business associations, in pursuit of a bill for pure
food and drugs. Wiley came out of the experience with a reputation as an expert and champion
of anti-adulteration measures. Therefore it was not a surprise when William E. Mason (R-IL),
chairman of the Senate Committee on Manufactures, hired Wiley as an analyst to guide the
committee during the fifty-one days of hearings on food adulteration in 1902.
Wiley analyzed food samples and interviewed witnesses. His daily interaction with the
investigation committee over two months established him as an authority on adulteration
(Anderson 1958, 129; Carpenter 2001, 262). The Mason hearings set the policy agenda,
focusing congressional attention on the adulteration of food and drugs and raising public
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awareness through press coverage. Momentum for legislation grew, and Wiley drafted the bill
that Mason introduced in the Senate in 1902. If Wiley was able to get the topic on the Senate
agenda, a coalition of baking powder, blended-whisky, and dairy interests managed to make sure
it never came up for a vote.
Wiley inevitably helped to create opposition to the pure food legislation he ardently
supported, by making statements and encouraging regulation that favored some companies’
products over others (High and Coppin 1988, 294). In addition to protecting the consumer,
Wiley was also interested in pure food legislation as a way to expand the importance and
authority of the Chemistry Division in the Department of Agriculture (Carpenter 2001; High and
Coppin 1988). Therefore, Wiley’s bureau was threatened when the National Association of State
Dairy and Food Departments suggested a separate bureau within the federal government be
created to administer the law.
It was this threat that spurred Wiley to action—he went to work securing support from
Robert M. Allen, secretary for the National Association of State Dairy and Food Departments,
his superior, Melville A. Scovell, and Edmund Taylor, maker of Old Taylor brand straight
whiskey for the McCumber-Hepburn bill (High and Coppin 1988, 294-95).

Although he did

not receive an official endorsement for the bill, Wiley was successful in garnering support from
the group’s executive committee (High and Coppin 1988, 295).
In December 1902, the House of Representatives passed a broad pure food and drug bill
introduced by William P. Hepburn of Iowa. Porter McCumber, the new chair of the Senate
Manufacturers Committee, attempted to introduce a similar bill, but due to opposition from the
proprietary drug industry, the publishing industry, and the National Wholesale Liquor Dealers
the Senate refused to consider the legislation (Carpenter 2001; High and Coppin 1988).
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McCumber’s Senate bill broadened the definition of drugs to “include any substance intended to
cure, mitigate or prevent disease,” which encompassed all proprietary medicines, and the
publishing industry stood to loose substantial revenues from advertising patent medicines (High
and Coppin 1988, 297). The whiskey rectifiers continued to oppose any pure food bill that
would require them to label their product as an “imitation.”
Frank Barrett, editor of the American Grocer, suggested to Wiley that the bill did not
pass due to the lack of public support (Carpenter 2001; High and Coppin 1988). Wiley thus set
out to broaden publicity of his cause against adulteration with research experiments using human
subjects to test the health implications of various adulterants. Wiley’s “Poison Squad” consisted
of a dozen volunteers restricted to specific diets, including food additives such as boric acid,
salicylic acid, and formaldehyde, which were all found to be harmful to the volunteers’ digestion
or health (Carpenter 2001; Temin 1980, 28). Wiley published his research results in Bulletin 84,
in which he concluded even small doses of specific adulterants can cause digestive disturbances
(Carpenter 2001, 264).
Wiley’s experiments received wide-spread attention from the public and Congress.
Partly due to increased public attention and concern, the 1902 and 1903 Appropriations Acts
granted new discretion and authority to the Agriculture Secretary and the Association of Official
Agricultural Chemists (AOAC) to set standards for food and drug purity. The drug market
became a subject of study in 1902, following the drug tragedy of a contaminated diphtheria
vaccine in children that resulted in the deaths of twenty-one children in Saint Louis, Missouri,
and Camden, New Jersey (Carpenter 2001; Young 1982). The 1902 Biologics Act passed in
response to this tragic event. Despite this advancement in regulation, Wiley’s goal for pure food
and drug legislation continued to face entrenched opposition by the Proprietary Association,
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blended-whiskey manufacturers, dairy interests, and baking powder interests. Once again, the
Fifty-Seventh Congress did not enact a pure-food law.
The Fifty-Eighth Congress considered the bill once more, and following a few
modifications the bill passed the House. Hearings in the Senate were even more extended. The
committee on Manufacturers took up the bill, and the definition of drugs was broadened to
include patent medicines. The committee reported the bill favorably on January 15. In February,
the Senate committee considered the measure that had passed the House. Attacks on patent
medicines resulted in powerful new opposition by the National Druggist, an influential journal
subsidized by proprietary interests, and the Proprietary Association of America (Anderson 1958,
157).
The Proprietary Association, a group of small patent medicine firms and their allied
newspapers, formed in 1881 (Temin 1980). Doctors and drug firms that used only ingredients
listed in the United States Pharmacopoeia and the National Formulary were in opposition to the
Proprietary Association. In the 1900s patent medicines, which were bought without the aid of a
doctor, were a threat to the profession. The Proprietary Association spent large sums of money
to influence legislators. By their investment in advertising they effectively controlled a large
portion of the nation’s press—sponsoring protest meetings, radio propaganda, and memorials
(Jackson 1970; Anderson 1958). In addition, the National Association of Wholesale Druggists
and the National Association of Retail Druggists also opposed the broadened definition of drugs
to include “any substance intended to be used for the cure, mitigation, or prevention of disease”
(Anderson 1958, 162). Wiley tried to reassure a variety of interests, and many chose to support
the bill before the Senate, including some food commissioners. Despite these positive
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implications, the bill reported to the Senate was not considered due to the strong opposition from
the drug trade (Anderson 1958, 163).
Prior to the convening of the Fifty-ninth Congress in December 1905, Wiley was able to
get the two principal women’s federations of the period, the Women’s Christian Temperance
Union and the General Federation of Women’s Clubs (GFWC), behind the bill. Support of the
women’s groups was important due to their effectiveness at keeping a constant pressure on
legislation (Anderson 1958). For example, the GFWC was the organizational backbone for the
early development of child and women’s welfare programs in the U.S. (Carpenter 2001, 265).
New Jersey activist Alice Lakey was particularly influential in securing the endorsement of the
New Jersey chapter and persuading the General Federation to create a pure-food committee. In
addition, she garnered support from the National Consumer’s League in support of Wiley’s
campaign (Carpenter 2001, 266). Finally, due to an alliance Wiley had with Charles A.L. Reed,
a Cincinnati physician and president of the American Medical Association (AMA), he received
support from the AMA as well.
Prior to 1900 pure food legislation was considered by the Agriculture Committee, which
was favorable toward the USDA. Yet, in the Fifty-Ninth Congress, the House and Senate
Agriculture Committees never saw the food and drug legislation. First, the bill was referred to
the Agriculture and Forestry Committee, but Redfield Proctor (R-VT), the Senate Agriculture
Committee chairman, requested the Agriculture Committee be excluded from considering any
pure food bills. James Wilson, Secretary of the USDA, and Proctor were developing a close
relationship and Secretary Wilson sought to restrict Wiley’s enforcement power (Carpenter
2001). Therefore, beginning in 1902, the Senate Committee on Manufacturers took authority
over the legislation. The House leadership referred the Hepburn bill to the Interstate and
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Foreign Commerce Committee, chaired by Representative James R. Mann, an Illinois
Republican (Carpenter 2001, 266).
Despite the committee assignment, Wiley’s coalition building, increased public interest,
and pressure from President Theodore Roosevelt to enact a food and drug law proved imperative
in influencing congressional members. Public interest was raised in part by the publication of
Upton Sinclair’s The Jungle 1 , and Samuel Hopkins Adams, Collier’s Weekly series.
Specifically, The Jungle highlighted the horrendous details of the meatpacking houses and
Collier’s Weekly brought to light the severity of drug adulteration (Carpenter 2001, 269; High
and Coppin 1988, 303-04).
The bill passed the House by a vote of 241 to 17, with 9 “present” votes, and 112
abstenations (High and Coppin 1988). Debate in the Senate was protracted due to fears that the
Chemistry Bureau was given too much regulatory control. Therefore, substitute measures were
introduced by Senator Hernando DeSoto Money (D-MS), limiting the power of the Bureau. But,
in the end Money voted for the bill, and the Senate passed the McCumber measure by 63 to 4,
with 22 senators abstaining. 2 Despite Congressional concern regarding the extension of federal
police power into the states and resistance to intrusion by the federal government into private
activities, the Wiley-Hepburn bill passed 241 to 17, and President Roosevelt signed the Pure
Food and Drugs Act of 1906 and the 1906 Meat Inspection Act into law the same day (Carpenter
2001, 269-270). The 1906 Pure Food and Drugs Act set forth requirements for food and drugs
sold in interstate commerce—it prohibited the interstate transport of unlawful food and drugs
under penalty of seizure of the products and/or prosecution of the responsible parties. Therefore,

1

Publication of Sinclair’s The Jungle, also influenced the passage of the Meat Inspection Act, signed into law the
same day as the Pure Food and Drugs Act (High and Coppin 1988, 304).
2
According to High and Coppin, the large number of abstenations may have been a protest to the public pressure
Wiley’s publicity campaign aroused (1988, 304).
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the act prohibited the shipment or delivery of adulterated or misbranded goods, but did not
directly regulate the adulteration or misbranding of food and drugs—it was product labeling that
was regulated (Ahmad 2007, 26).
Debate exists as to whether the passage of the 1906 Act was due to special interests
(Kolko 1967) or as an attempt to expand bureaucratic power (Coppin and High 1999; Carpenter
2001), and yet others suggest the law was enacted due to a “mixture of bureaucratic, producer
and consumer interests,” including consumer interests brought about by muckraking journalism
(Law 2004, 5). What is apparent is that the Progressive Era was influenced by the political
maneuvering of Harvey Wiley, industrialization, the rise in laissez-faire capitalism, and the
growth in collective action organizations (Wood 1986, 67).
Business advocates of the Pure Food and Drugs Act were interested in reducing
competition for their businesses, consumer advocates desired the public be safeguarded from
“unscrupulous business principles,” and Congress was viewed by many interest groups as a tool
for their self-interest (Wood, 1986, 68). The entrepreneurial activity of Harvey Wiley coalesced
the interest of many business and public interest groups in an effort to overcome the equilibrium
that had resulted in a protracted legislative battle for pure food and drugs. In combination with a
venue change from the Agriculture Committee to the Senate Committee on Manufacturers and
the House Interstate and Foreign Commerce Committee, these interests proceeded to influence
congressional members by framing adulteration as an issue of public safety and truth-inadvertising—resulting in the passage of the Pure Food and Drugs Act.
Enforcement of the Pure Food and Drugs Act rested with the Bureau of Chemistry, which
was renamed the Food, Drug, and Insecticide Administration in 1927. The name was shortened
in 1931 to the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) and was transferred from the USDA to the
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Federal Security Agency (later renamed the Department of Health and Human Services –DHHS)
(Law 2004, 5). Following the 1906 Food and Drugs Act, from 1906 to 1929 drug legislation
focused on prohibiting false labeling—congressional oversight committees became more aware
of the profits garnered by the drug industry as drug sales rose.
Between 1906 and 1929 drug industry sales increased by a factor of six, with patent
medicines, those that contained secret ingredients, accounting for half of all sales (Temin 1980,
38; Grabowski and Vernon 1983). Further, in 1911 the Supreme Court ruled the 1906 Food and
Drugs Act prohibited false and misleading statements about the ingredients or identity of a drug,
but not false therapeutic claims. In 1912, Congress enacted the Sherley Amendment to
overcome the 1911 ruling, prohibiting labeling medicines with false therapeutic claims intended
to defraud the purchaser (FDA 2006). A difficult standard to prove. This flaw would lead to
further regulatory reform over the following decades.
The policy entrepreneurship of Harvey Wiley led to an alliance of multiple networks,
which culminated in the passage of the Pure Food and Drugs Act. The research revolution,
Wiley’s “Poison Squad,” and market competition drew attention and support for the first federal
food and drug law. Business advocates—the nonadulterating producers, consumer advocates
and Harvey Wiley were the winners in this protracted battle. On the other hand, despite their
ardent opposition, the Proprietary Association lost their effort to have patent medicines excluded
from the new law. The U.S. government did not have a direct interest in the success of the
pharmaceutical industry. Thus, early drug safety laws indicate the pharmaceutical industry was
not yet an influential actor in the policy domain (Ceccoli 2004). Further, the transfer of pure
food and drug legislation from the Agricultural Committee to the Commerce Committees
impacted the thrust of the bill. The Commerce Committees interpreted the regulatory issue at
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hand to be one of mislabeling. Over the following decades, pharmaceutical regulation would
further evolve in a centralized and regulatory fashion.
1938 – 1961: Market Mechanisms and Centralized Control
The second period of drug regulation from 1938 to 1961 was often a result of focusing
events opening a policy window for legislative action and expanded bureaucratic authority. For
example, the diethylene glycol (1937), sulfathiazole tablets (1941), and chloramphenicol (1952)
incidents led to legislation requiring proof of safety and efficacy. The 1906 law had provided
the Bureau of Chemistry with little enforcement power. Therefore, from 1930 through the
1950’s, the focus was on extending control and regulation over prescription drug manufacturing
vis-à-vis quality control measures enforced by the FDA. The reform legislation was written
within the FDA; therefore, it is no surprise the law would end up strengthening the agency
(Temin 1980).
Similar to the 1906 act, congressional debate was protracted. President Roosevelt was
supportive, but did not work actively for its passage. Public support or opposition was scant and
the proprietary drug industry did not openly oppose the bill for fear they would destroy public
confidence in their products (Temin 1980). Yet, the patent medicine manufacturers worked
behind the scenes to weaken the law. It was also during this time that the pharmaceutical
industry evolved into an industry that “discovered, developed, and marketed drugs of real use in
treating disease” (Hilts 2003, 95). The drug tragedies of this period, the political maneuvering of
Rexford Tugwell, Assistant Secretary of Agriculture, Walter Campbell, the FDA bureau chief,
and pressure from consumer advocates provided the attention necessary to end the five year
legislative battle. The passage of the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act of 1938 broadened
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the definition of drugs, included medical devices, restricted the range of drugs that could be
offered, and mandated what information should be supplied to the consumer.
The “Tugwell Bill,” as it was commonly known, was introduced in 1933 by Senator
Royal S. Copeland (D-NY), member and later chairmen, of the Commerce Committee (Cavers
1939). Tugwell, a Columbia University economist, had a preference of planned economies. He
“was universally unpopular with those in the business community” (Ceccoli 2004, 69). The new
bill would prohibit misstatements and advertising claims and all ingredients were required to be
listed on the bottle. Tugwell’s intent was to improve self-medication by safeguarding the
consumer. Despite his unpopularity with the business community, the entire food and drug
industry were not unified against the bill. Only those who stood to lose the most profit were
particularly vigilant in their attacks of the measure. The two trade groups most active in their
attacks were the Proprietary Association and the Institute of Medicine Manufacturers (Hilts
2003). The major issues of concern to the opposition, particularly the Proprietary Association,
were, (1.) the FDA’s power of multiple seizures, (2.) whether control of advertising of foods,
drugs, and cosmetics should be under the jurisdiction of the FDA or the FTC, and (3.) the power
of the Secretary of Agriculture to establish tolerances for poisons (Cavers 1939).
The American Medical Association, women’s clubs, scientists, state health officials,
pharmacists, public health groups, and a few companies that sought a competitive advantage
supported the bill in its original form. Some of these groups were interested in further consumer
protection. Indeed, the AMA, the Consumers’ Research group, and the American
Pharmaceutical Association did not support revised versions of the bill, because industry groups
were allowed to remove the requirement that drugs should be proven safe before being marketed
(Hilts 2003, 88). In an effort to imitate Harvey Wiley’s Poison Squad, the FDA assembled a

48

graphic display of the 1906 pharmaceutical and other regulation shortcomings referred to as the
“Chamber of Horrors” 3 (Hilts 2003; FDA 2006). By the time hearings were scheduled, trade
organizations were well organized against the bill—with the drug industry charging the bill was
an effort to prevent the American people from exercising their right to self-medication.
As a result of the hearings held before the Senate Committee on Commerce and the
House Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, it became obvious that concessions
would be required in order to appease the opposition to the point where the measure could be
passed. Senator Copeland agreed to numerous modifications along the way, but while one
concession appeased one interest, yet another grew in opposition. The Federal Trade
Commission (FTC) became a strong opponent, due to the jurisdictional turf battle between the
FTC and the FDA over false advertising. The Tugwell bill ended in a legislative disaster;
however, the glycol tragedy would serve as the basis for increased regulation (Ceccoli 2004).
In 1937 diethylene glycol killed 107 people, many women and children. The Massengill
Company, a respected drug firm, sought to sell a liquid form of sulfanilamide by dissolving
sulfanilamide in diethylene glycol, which was later found to be toxic (Cavers 1939; Temin 1980,
42; Hilts 2003). The FDA recovered almost the entire amount of product that had been
distributed, but only because it had been falsely labeled an “elixir,” otherwise the FDA would
have had no legal basis for the seizure. In addition, the label did not include the fatal
ingredient—diethylene glycol. This focusing event placed greater relevance and importance on
banning interstate commerce of harmful substances. After five years of legislative hearings, four
major revisions, and the diethylene glycol incident, President Roosevelt signed the Federal Food,
Drug, and Cosmetic Act (FDCA) into law on June 25, 1938.

3

The exhibit included pictures, labels, and adulterated or deceptive packaging that was beyond the enforcement of
the FDA under the 1906 Act.
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The Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act of 1938 overhauled the 1906 Food and Drug
Act, requiring drugs to be marketed with adequate directions for safe use, extended FDA
authority to include medical devices and cosmetics, eliminated the Sherley Amendment
requirement to prove intent to defraud in drug misbranding cases, and introduced mandatory premarket approval for new drugs (Law 2004, 6). Manufacturers would now have to demonstrate
the safety of their products and obtain the approval from the FDA via a new drug application
(NDA). Equally important, the 1938 regulation allowed the FDA to inspect production facilities
to ensure accuracy and credibility of manufacturer-provided information. It also made it
mandatory for consumers to visit licensed doctors in order to receive a prescription for certain
classes of drugs thought to be unsafe, without direction by a physician (Temin 1980, 49-50;
Wertheimer and Santella 2007, 305). While the 1906 Act had focused on the prevention of
consumer fraud, the 1938 act outlawed unsafe products in the interest of protecting the
consumer. It was apparent government regulation was moving in a direction to provide more
protection to the consumer.
Despite the passage of the Act, the Winthrop Chemical Company of New York
distributed sulfathiazole tablets tainted with phenobarbital, resulting in approximately 300 deaths
and injuries in 1941 (Swann 1999; FDA 2006). This event opened a policy window for the FDA
to revise manufacturing and quality controls, commonly known as good manufacturing practices
(GMP). In 1948 the Supreme Court upheld the FDA interdiction in the sale of illegal drugs by
pharmacies. The court ruling extended the jurisdiction of the FDA into retail distribution where
the sale of illegal drugs, especially barbiturates and amphetamines was rampant (FDA 2006).
Disagreement over whether to include amphetamines and barbiturates as prescription drugs led
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to conflict between physicians, pharmacists, drug companies, and the FDA (Temin 1980; Law
2004, 7).
The policy response was the Humphrey-Durham Amendment in 1951, which defined
prescription drugs as those unsafe for self-medication and which should therefore be used only
under a doctor’s supervision (FDA 2008). Shortly following the 1951 amendments, the FDA
conducted a nationwide factory investigation which revealed that chloramphenicol, an antibiotic,
was linked to 180 incidents of blood diseases. The American Society of Hospital Pharmacies,
the American Association of Medical Record Librarians, and the American Medical Association
were engaged by the FDA in a voluntary drug reaction reporting program (FDA 2006). The
remainder of drug regulation in the 1950s focused on factory inspection and the intricacies
between proof of safety and efficacy.
From the development of penicillin in 1941 to the late 1950s, major advances in
pharmaceutical innovation occurred, including the introduction of antibiotics (e.g. penicillin,
tetracyclines), tranquilizers, antihypertensives, diuretics, and antidiabetic agents (Temin 1980,
65; Grabowski and Vernon 1983, 2). Competition in the pharmaceutical market increased, with
a focus on new chemical entities (NCE) at the rate of over fifty per year. Following World War
II the drug industry transformed from one of small firms to one of large firms. Companies
introduced products for which they held patents or patent rights—together with aggressive
advertising—these new drugs resulted in “high profits, growing sales, and growing firms in the
1950s” (Temin 1980, 76). With increased competition and development of NCEs congressional
oversight committees began to turn their attention to the high profits earned by a portion of the
industry. In addition, patents and trademarks received increased congressional attention, as they
were thought to be the source of above-average profits (Grabowski and Vernon 1983).

51

The drug tragedies of this era opened a window for policy change in combination with
the political maneuvering of Assistant Secretary of Agriculture, Rexford Tugwell and bureau
chief, Walter Campbell. The passage of the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act of 1938
broadened the definition of drugs, to include medical devices and introduced mandatory premarket approval for new drugs among other provisions. This premarket approval process is the
basis for current drug regulation in the U.S. With the passage of the 1938 Act, consumers were
ensured stronger safeguards, and the FDA expanded their enforcement authority. The drug
industry on the other hand, came under intense scrutiny due to drug related deaths and their
increased profit margins. Following the 1938 Act, pharmaceutical regulation would change little
over the next three decades until the early 1960s.
1962 – 1991: Stringent Centralized Controls
The policy entrepreneurship of Senator Estes Kefauver (D-TN) and the thalidomide drug
tragedy catalyzed the third period of drug regulation. Kefauver’s 1962 amendments
strengthened and centralized the drug review process while also expanding the regulatory
jurisdiction of the FDA. Following passage of the 1962 amendments, pharmaceutical
manufacturers were required to receive regulatory approval prior to clinical testing and
marketing—standards that would impact the agency’s performance over the next three decades.
The debate concerning pharmaceutical profits, markups, the availability of over the
counter drugs, and drug efficacy continued to dominate the agenda in the late 1950s and early
1960s. In 1959 Senator Estes Kefauver (D-TN), Chairman, of the U.S. Senate Antitrust and
Monopoly Subcommittee held a series of hearings in an effort to raise salience and gain expertise
regarding pharmaceutical pricing and patenting (Temin 1980; Meier 1985, 83). Kefauver
introduced an amendment to the Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act in an effort to expand Judiciary
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Committee turf. The amendment sought to foster competition among drug companies and
increase FDA authority over drug manufacturing and introductions by requiring drug companies
to license, produce, and sell their products at a maximum of 8 percent of sales (Temin 1980).
The bill also focused on safety—requiring new drugs to be proven safe and efficacious before
being marketed. Although several notable physicians supported the bill, the legislation was
completely revised—the licensing provision was completely removed before being reported out
of the Judiciary Committee. Shortly after, the thalidomide drug tragedy raised public awareness
concerning drug dangers.
In 1960 a subsidiary of the Vick Chemical Company, Richardson-Merrell, Inc., applied
for FDA approval of thalidomide, (a sedative, marketed as a remedy for the symptoms of
morning sickness). An FDA examiner, Dr. Frances Kelsey, refused to let the application take
effect on the grounds of insufficient information. In 1961 thalidomide was identified as the
source of phocomelia—a condition where children are born without hands or feet—in thousands
of babies in Europe (Temin 1980; Grabowski and Vernon 1983; Hilts 2003; Law 2004).
Evidence from Europe linking thalidomide with birth defects caused the Kefauver
committee to refocus its attention on safety issues (Grabowski and Vernon 1983; Meier 1985,
83). The thalidomide incident was the impetus for the Kefauver-Harris bill. The revised bill
required claims of effectiveness in new drug applications (NDA) to be supported by “substantial
evidence,” but the provision to lower the price of brand name drugs was removed on the
Kennedy administration’s orders (Temin 1980, 124). President Kennedy and Senator Kefauver
differed on pharmaceutical pricing reform (Ceccoli 2004).
The 1962 Kefauver-Harris drug amendments required FDA approval before a drug could
be marketed and gave the FDA jurisdiction over the testing of new drugs. Drug companies
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would have to receive FDA approval of their procedure before beginning their investigational
drug tests, now regulated by investigational new drug (IND) requirements (Temin 1980;
Grabowski and Vernon 1983; Hilts 2003; FDA 2006). In addition, drug companies were
required (1) to adhere to a set of good manufacturing practices, and (2) use generic names and
brand names on labels and advertisements. The FDA was granted further administrative power
to withdraw applications that had been approved prior to 1962 (Temin 1980, 125). These
amendments were revolutionary—for the first time drug companies would be required to conduct
scientific studies.
Drug company executives and their allies claimed the new regulations would result in the
slashing of expansion plans and slow new drug development—resulting in higher costs for the
consumer (Hilts 2003, 161). The Pharmaceutical Manufacturers Association representative, L.T.
Coggeshall, claimed, “in the present climate of strict regulation, scientists would no longer want
to go into drug company research” (Hilts 2003, 161). The AMA also fought the new law—as a
threat to their authority to determine the effectiveness of drug treatment. Despite this opposition
from the pharmaceutics industry, the bill passed—further expanding the regulatory role for the
FDA.
Since the passage of the 1962 Drug Amendments, federal drug regulations have evolved
over several lines. In some cases, regulation strengthened the government’s authority over drug
trade. For example, the agenda of the 1980s and 1990s focused on drug application review,
concerns over a drug lag, availability of generic drugs, and reimportation restrictions due to
safety concerns. In the 1980s more than one thousand AIDS activists staged a demonstration in
front of the FDA’s headquarters in an effort to lobby for access to investigational drugs (Ahmad
2007). As a result of this interest group pressure, the 1983 Orphan Drug Act was passed, which
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enabled the FDA to promote research and marketing of drugs needed to treat rare diseases that
would normally be unprofitable or unpatentable (Villarreal 2001).
Disease-based interest groups continued pressuring the FDA and in 1987 drug regulations
were revised to expand access to experimental drugs for patients with serious diseases with no
alternative therapies. The FDA began to allow personal importation of drugs as a result of AIDS
activist lobbying for access to medications not yet available in the United States (Wertheimer
and Santella 2007, 306). Yet, in 1988 Congress found the resale of drugs outside commercial
channels resulted in the distribution of mislabeled, adulterated, and counterfeit drugs to the
public. Therefore, the Prescription Drug Marketing Act of 1988 was passed, which banned the
diversion of prescription drugs from legitimate commercial channels, required drug wholesalers
to be licensed by the states, and restricted reimportation from other countries (Greenberg 1988;
FDA 2006). Manufacturers of drugs in other countries were thus required to meet FDA
standards and allow FDA inspections. Despite these provisions, the importation of
pharmaceuticals continued.
In other cases, regulations were enacted to encourage the pre-market approval process for
new drugs. The pharmaceutical industry and medical community became concerned about the
pace of FDA review for new drugs—defined as the rate at which new pharmaceuticals become
available to consumers. William Wardell, a Board-certified Clinical Pharmacologist, identified
what he termed a “drug lag”—showing that the United States fell behind other similarly
advanced countries in the number of new drugs available (Wardell et al. 2007). In the 1990s,
partially due to concern over a drag lag, there were many requests to overhaul the FDA drug
regulations, especially from the Republican-controlled Congress, led principally by the House
speaker, Newt Gingrich (Ahmad 2007, 28). The drug lag debate highlighted the substantial
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differences in performance between the FDA and its international counterparts over the next
decade.
Pharmaceutical regulation in the 1960s was ushered in by the political maneuvering of a
skilled policy entrepreneur—Senator Estes Kefuaver (D-TN) and a high profile drug tragedy.
The 1962 amendments further expanded the regulatory jurisdiction of the FDA, and strengthened
consumer confidence in drug safety. For the first time drug companies would be required to
conduct scientific studies and receive premarket approval. Following this landmark legislation,
the FDA came under intense scrutiny regarding their drug review performance. The “drug lag”
debate opened a window for the pharmaceutical industry, academic reformers, and disease-based
interest groups to pressure the FDA into altering their processes. The next period of drug
regulation reflects this change in policy actors—evidenced by the evolving relationship between
the pharmaceutical industry and the FDA.
1992 – 2002: Accommodating Public Access
The fourth period of drug regulation sharply diverged from the post-1962 emphasis on
safety and efficacy standards. By the late 1980s the pharmaceutical industry and an
academically based regulatory reform movement started to compare FDA performance with their
international counterparts. William Wardell published numerous articles documenting the
existence of a drug lag in the United States. For example, he demonstrated that between 1962
and 1976 the U.S. had 3.5 times fewer drugs available compared to the United Kingdom (Ceccoli
2004). The existence of a drug lag was further documented from organizations and economic
departments such as the American Enterprise Institute (AEI), the University of Chicago, and the
Tufts University Center for the Study of Drug Development (CSDD). In 1980 a subsequent
international drug lag comparison was conducted by the General Accounting Office of Congress
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(GAO), they concluded the U.S. and Sweden had the longest average approval time (Ceccoli
2004; Hilts 2003, 277).
In 1980 Congress also began holding oversight hearings to investigate the slow approval
process of the FDA. The Republican Party spearheaded the investigation, but was later joined by
the pharmaceutical industry, academics, disease-based interest groups and Democratic and
Republican members of Congress (Ceccoli 2004). The drug lag debate provided the window of
opportunity for the pharmaceutics industry, the academic reform movement, and disease-based
interest groups to challenge the policy monopoly that supported a more risk-averse approach to
drug regulation.
David Kessler, FDA Commissioner, was instrumental in aligning the interest of industry,
Republicans, and a diverse group of patient activists. Kessler worked with the Pharmaceutical
Manufacturers Association and PhRMA to draft a bill that would provide user fees to the FDA
and extend the types of drugs that were eligible for expedited review (Ceccoli 2004). The
legislation was co-authored in the House by Energy and Commerce Committee chairman Henry
Waxman (D-CA). Edward Kennedy (D-MA) and Orin Hatch (R-UT), the chair and ranking
Republican respectively, co-authored a similar bill in the Senate Labor and Human Resource
Committee. In 1992 the Prescription Drug User Fee Act (PDUFA) was enacted and later
renewed in 1997, 2002, and again in 2007. The FDA began to require drug and biologics
manufacturers to pay fees for product applications, supplements, and other services, including
hiring reviewers to assess applications (Law 2004, 8; FDA 2006). The passage of the PDUFA
ushered in a transformation of the relationship between industry and the FDA.
Prior to 1992 the industry and the FDA had a contentious relationship, because the
pharmaceutics industry perceived the FDA as being too cautious. The FDA in turn questioned
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the motives of the pharmaceutics industry (Ceccoli 2004). With the passage of the PDUFA
review times began to drop immediately, but concern rose that the FDA was at the mercy of the
drug industry due to the substantial financial fees the agency received (Hilts 2003; Okie 2005).
The dependency of the FDA on the pharmaceutical industry fees was further exacerbated by
Congress’ tendency to reduce overall federal funding to the FDA since the mid 1990s (Ceccoli
2004; Hilts 2003). This dependency is evidenced by the fact that user fees from pharmaceutical
companies account for more than half the money dedicated to the review process (Hilts 2003,
280; Okie 2005, 1064; Ahmad 2007).
In 1997 the Food and Drug Administration Modernization Act (FDAMA) reauthorized
the PDUFA of 1992 and mandated the most wide-ranging reforms since the Food Drug and
Cosmetic Act of 1938 (FDA 2008). The FDAMA “liberalized the FDA’s approval criteria,
reduced the number of clinical trials required to demonstrate the effectiveness of a new drug, and
accelerated the drug-approval process” (Ahmad 2007, 29). The 2002 renewal of the PDUFA
was included in a bioterrorism bill which increased industry fees to the FDA—earmarked to
speed drug approvals. Subsequent renewals have been viewed by some as “giant giveaways to
the pharmaceutical industry,” due to the Act’s requirement that the FDA lower its standards for
drug approvals (e.g., accepting one clinical trial) (Angell 2004, 204).
The passage of the 1992 Prescription Drug User Fee Act was catalyzed by a coalition that
helped change the image of pharmaceutical regulation from one of safety and efficacy to that of
consumer access. AIDS activist effectively pressured such change due to their expertise and
their relentless activism. The PDUFA represented a major change in focus from protecting the
public from adulterated, misbranded, and unsafe drugs to one of assuring access to new drugs
more quickly. Some have argued that the PDUFA and the FDA’s shrinking resources to monitor
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post-marketing safety problems, suggest the industry receives greater attention than the public
health mission (Isamail 2005).
With the passage of the PDUFA, user fees were levied on the pharmaceutical industry in
order to sponsor new drug applications and annual regulatory guidelines were also mandated for
the FDA. Such changes reflect a policy image that moved from safety and effectiveness to one
of access. The pharmaceutical industry and disease-based interest groups benefited by changes
in the new drug application process, but the FDA came under increasing scrutiny. Two
landmark drug events in 2004 would raise consumer protection to the forefront of the agenda
once more.
2003 – 2007: Expanded Entitlement & Renewed Safety Concerns
On December 8, 2003 President George W. Bush signed the Medicare Prescription Drug
Improvement and Modernization Act (MMA) into law, which made the largest overhaul in the
history of Medicare by authorizing Medicare coverage of outpatient prescription drugs, in
addition to other changes (Oliver et al. 2004). Despite this historical event, public opinion on the
final bill was negative. According to a poll that was taken during the week the bill was signed
into law, 47 percent of senior citizens were in opposition to the changes (Oliver et al. 2004, 284).
However, the bill passed partly due to presidential and congressional changes, which opened a
window of opportunity for the MMA. It is important to note the pharmaceutical industry resisted
a centrally administered federal program and in the end influenced the provisions of the enacted
bill.
One of the most significant provisions of the bill maintained the current ban on
reimporting prescription drugs from other countries, but authorized the FDA to study the
potential impact of reimportation from Canada. Thus, one of the major beneficiaries of the new
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plan was the pharmaceutical industry, which spent more than 108 million dollars on lobbying for
the MMA (Lipowski and McKercher 2007, 341). The pharmaceutical industry could now expect
higher demand, no direct administration of benefits by the government, no cost control measures,
and drug reimportation remained illegal (Oliver et al. 2004, 318; Oliver et al. 2007). The AFLCIO, Association of Federal, State, County and Municipal Employees did not support the bill
due to the inadequacy of the drug benefit. Despite this opposition the bill passed.
In 2004, pharmaceutical safety emerged on the agenda once more. Two landmark events:
(1) the determination that the use of selective serotonin reuptake inhibitors (SSRI)
antidepressants in children were associated with suicidal behavior, and (2) the withdrawal of the
cyclooxygenase (COX)-2 inhibitor drug rofecoxib from the market due to its association with
cardiovascular events affected all stakeholders in the pharmaceutical policy domain. Once again
drug safety rose to the top of the systemic agenda (Ahmad 2007, 30).
Over the past century drug tragedies and policy entrepreneurs have been the catalyst for
major changes in drug regulation. The antidepressant and rofecoxib debacles may be an
opportunity for yet a new period in U.S. drug policy. Recent debate has centered on the creation
of a new center for post-marketing drug regulation, whether the FDA can meet its mission, and
pharmaceutical industry post-market compliance. These events may be an indicator of a new
period in U.S. drug regulation—a move to recentralize control with the FDA to ensure greater
safety. Whether meaningful policy change will occur—only time will tell.
Conclusion
The story of the development and evolution of U.S. pharmaceutical regulation illustrates
the dynamic of policy change, which is dependent on shifts in issue salience, as well as, the
actions of actors and events inside and outside of government. The major component of post
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New-Deal pharmaceutical policy has been a mix of safety and access policies. These policies
began by increasing the control and authority of the FDA (and its predecessors in the USDA) and
ended with a new relationship between Congress, the FDA, the pharmaceutics industry, and
disease-based interest groups.
The historical development of the Food and Drug Administration began with the passage
of the 1906 Pure Food and Drugs Act. Responsibility for enforcement of the 1906 Act was later
transferred to the FDA's predecessor, the Bureau of Chemistry. In July 1927, the Bureau of
Chemistry's name was changed to the Food, Drug, and Insecticide Administration, which also
led to the non-regulatory research function of the bureau being transferred to other divisions
within the department (FDA, 2008). In July 1930 the name was further shortened to the present
version. "FDA remained under the Department of Agriculture until June 1940, when the agency
was moved to the new Federal Security Agency. In April 1953 the agency again was transferred,
to the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare (HEW). Fifteen years later FDA became
part of the Public Health Service within HEW, and in May 1980 the education function was
removed from HEW to create the Department of Health and Human Services, FDA's current
home" (FDA, 2008).
Although the relationship between the FDA and the pharmaceutics industry was
contentious for the better part of a century, the passage of the Prescription Drug User Fee Act
resulted in a shift in the policy actors. The pharmaceutics industry and disease-based interest
groups effectively pressured the FDA to modify their regulatory processes. In the remaining
chapters I am concerned with detailing how the pharmaceutical subsystem functions over a long
period of time. Once it has been established that participation in the subsystem varies over time,
the task becomes understanding how political variation impacts the policy process. In order to
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do this, in Chapter 4, I map political change over a sixty-year time span by focusing on bill
introductions and referrals.
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Table 3.1 Distinctive Periods in the Regulation of New Medicines
1906-1937

1938-1961

1962-1991

2003-2007
Expanded
entitlements &
renewed safety
concerns

Fundamental
Philosophy

Patent
Medicine
Correction

Focusing
Event

Unsanitary
conditions;
quacks

Elixir Sulfanilamide
(diethylene glycol)

Thalidomide

AIDS-related
deaths

Selective
Serotonin
Reuptake
inhibitors;
rofecoxib

Landmark
Law

1906 Pure
Food and
Drugs Act

1938 Federal Food,
Drug, and Cosmetic
Act

1962
Kefauver
Amendments

1992
Prescription
Drug User Fee
Act

Medicare
Modernization Act

Benefactors

Harvey Wiley;
Consumers;
food
commissioners;
Women’s
Clubs; AMA

Scientists;
Consumers; State
Health Officials;
Public Health
Groups; a few
Companies

Consumers;
FDA

AIDS activist;
Cancer activist;
industry; FDA

Pharmaceutical
Industry;
Physicians; AARP

Centralized Control

Stringent
centralized
controls

1992-2002
Accommodating
Public Access

Source:
Ceccoli 2003 &
Author
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Table 3.1 Milestones of Drug Regulation in the United States-1848-2003
1848
Drug Importation Act passed by Congress requires U.S. Customs Service inspection to stop entry of
adulterated drugs from overseas.
1906
The original Food and Drugs Act passed by Congress prohibits interstate commerce in misbranded
and adulterated foods, drinks and drugs.
1911
U.S. vs. Johnson, the Supreme Court rules that 1906 Food and Drugs Act prohibits false and
misleading statements about the ingredients or identity of a drug.
1912
Congress enacts the Sherley Amendment to overcome the ruling in U.S. vs. Johnson. Amendment
prohibits labeling medicines with false therapeutic claims.
1933
FDA recommends a complete revision of the obsolete 1906 Food and Drugs Act. The first bill is
introduced into the Senate, launching a five-year legislative battle.
1937
Elixir Sulfanilamide, containing the poisonous solvent diethylene glycol, kills 107 persons,
dramatizing the need to establish drug safety before marketing and to enact stringent drug laws.
1938
The Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic (FDC) Act of 1938 is passed by Congress. In addition to
other provisions, new drugs had to be shown safe before marketing, thus starting a new system of
drug regulation.
1948
Supreme Court rules in U.S. v. Sullivan that FDA's jurisdiction extends to retail distribution, thereby
permitting FDA to interdict in pharmacies illegal sales of drugs--the most problematical being
barbituates and amphetamines.
1951
Durham-Humphrey Amendment defines the kinds of drugs that cannot be used safely without
medical supervision and restricts their sale to prescription by a licensed practitioner.
1962
Kefauver-Harris Drug Amendments are passed to ensure drug efficacy and greater drug safety. For
the first time, drug manufacturers are required to prove to the FDA the effectiveness of their
products before marketing them.
1966
Fair Packaging and Labeling Act requires all consumer products in interstate commerce to be
accurately labeled, with FDA enforcing provisions on drugs.
1984
Drug Price Competition and Patent Term Restoration Act (Hatch-Waxman Act) expedites the
availability of less costly generic drugs by permitting the FDA to approve applications to market
generic versions of brand-name drugs without repeating the research done to prove them safe and
effective.
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Milestones of Drug Regulation in the United States-continued
1988
Food and Drug Administration Act of 1988 officially establishes FDA as an agency of the
Department of Health and Human Services with a Commissioner of Food and Drugs appointed by
the President with the advice and consent of the Senate.
The Prescription Drug Marketing Act bans the diversion of prescription drugs from legitimate
commercial channels. The new law requires drug wholesalers to be licensed by the states; restricts
reimportation from other countries; and bans sale, trade or purchase of drug samples, and traffic or
counterfeiting of redeemable drug coupons.
1992
Generic Drug Enforcement Act imposes debarment and other penalties for illegal acts involving
abbreviated drug applications.
The U.S. FDA with Japan and Europe establish the International Conference on Harmonization
(ICH). The ICH works to reduce the burden of regulation by harmonizing regulatory requirements in
the three regions.
Prescription Drug User Fee Act (PDUFA) requires drug and biologics manufacturers to pay fees for
product applications and supplements, and other services. The act also requires FDA to use these
funds to hire more reviewers to assess applications.
1997
Food and Drug Administration Modernization Act (FDAMA) reauthorizes the Prescription Drug User
Fee Act of 1992 and mandates the most wide-ranging reforms in agency practices since 1938.
2003
The Medicare Prescription Drug Improvement and Modernization Act requires, among other
elements, that a study be made of how current and emerging technologies can be utilized to make
essential information about prescription drugs available to the blind and visually impaired.
Source: FDA 2007
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4
Agenda Status and Policy Subsystems
“The complete “dance of the legislature” encompasses several discrete events—bill introduction,
the referral of legislation to committee, hearings, the reporting of legislation from committee,
and floor activity. These various activities are both the heart and soul of the legislative process
and key determinants of winners and losers in the policy game.” – Worsham 1997, 64
In the preceding chapters I discussed how any attempt to understand the course of public
policy, must inevitably, consider why one set of issues is addressed through policy while an
equally important set of alternative issues are not. Specifically, the historical account of
pharmaceutical policy in the United States provided an excellent example of how the variation of
policy participants combined with external events can and does impact policy outcomes. Once
an issue has been defined, policy actors must be engaged in order for the issue to be placed on
the decision making agenda (Eyestone 1978). In an effort to determine how Congress has
governed the agenda of pharmaceutical policy, I examine bill introductions in the House and
Senate from 1947-2007.
Bill introductions serve as an important indicator of congressional interest in a policy
area. Although few bills actually become law, bills are an indicator of the goals members of
Congress wish to accomplish (Schiller 1995). Legislators are constrained by political and
institutional contexts; therefore, bill introductions provide insight into the issues that are given
priority status. Further, bill referrals provide insight into committee jurisdiction and competition.
I have three objectives for this chapter. First, I present analysis concerning the rise and
fall of pharmaceutical bill introductions in both chambers, where the overall level of
pharmaceutical policy activity is ascertained. Second, I provide an examination of the issue
composition of the introductions in an effort to identify the topics that receive the most attention.
Third, I present information concerning the referral of bill introductions. The presence of bill
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referrals illustrates committee competition and monopoly (Wilkerson, Feeley, Schiereck and Sue
1999; King 1997). In addition, bill referral and sponsorship help to indicate the success or
failure of entrepreneurial activity.
Congressional Interest and Policy Jurisdiction
Like others who have made an effort to track agenda entrance with a focus on legislative
activity (Worsham 1997; Wilkerson, et al 2002; Ringquist, Worsham and Eisner 2003; Worsham
2006), I focus on legislative introductions as a first step in tracking the level of congressional
interest in the policy domain. Similarly, I use bill referrals as a means of getting a feel for the
level of competition in the pharmaceutical policy domain (King 1994, 1997). The data on
legislative introductions were gathered using The Congressional Bills Project, as well as the
THOMAS search engine. I include simple, concurrent, joint resolutions, and public bills in the
count. The congressional bills project data were gathered using the topic codes “Regulation of
Drug Industry, Medical Devices and Clinical Labs” and “Prescription Drug Coverage and
Costs.” The congressional bills project data yielded 1,063 bills, 956 in the House and 107 in the
Senate for the years 1947 to 1998. A THOMAS subject search using the key term “prescription
drugs” yielded 402 bills, 214 in the House and 188 in the Senate for the years 1999 to 2007. The
Congressional Bills Project data were combined with the THOMAS search yielding a total of
1,465 bills—1,170 in the House and 295 in the Senate. 4
Associated with the move from a system characterized by a policy monopoly to one in
the throes of competition is a loosening of subsystem control over the dominant image
underlying the policy equilibrium. Thus, like others who have tracked legislative activity,
(Worsham 2006; Hardin 2002; Baumgartner and Jones 1993) the topic of bills were coded after
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reading the tile and summary of each introduction. As suggested by Babbie (1998, 314), I
utilized the “mostly” rule of thumb—meaning what is the content of the material mostly about.
The coding scheme is intended to highlight six dimensions of pharmaceutical policy, coding
legislation based on bill titles and/or summary remarks found in the Congressional Bills Project
and THOMAS. Bills coded Safety include legislation dealing with the general safety and or
effectiveness of pharmaceutical products. An example is a bill to amend the Federal Food, Drug,
and Cosmetic Act and related provisions of law to improve the protection of the public health
and safety with respect to drugs. Manufacturing and Distribution includes legislation that
discusses drug manufacturing and distribution. For example, legislation regulating the
manufacture, compounding, processing, distribution, and possession of habit forming barbiturate
and amphetamine drugs, or a bill to amend the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act relating to
the distribution chain of prescription drugs.
Drug Marketing includes legislation that discusses drug marketing, licensing, labeling,
and advertising. Access includes legislation that focuses on increasing access to certain
populations, such as veterans and Medicare or Medicaid recipients. Cost contains legislation that
specifically seeks to address efforts to increase the affordability of prescription drugs.
Importation includes legislation that discusses the intent to modify the law to allow importation
from designated countries, restrict importations, discussions concerning the regulation of internet
pharmacies, and exportation provisions. The final category, Other, is a catch-all for bills that do
not fit the other six categories.
A review of figures 1 and 2 (House and Senate bill content, respectively) reveals the
obvious, more legislation is introduced in the House than is the case in the Senate, and both
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The THOMAS search term “prescription drugs” was selected following verification of consistency between The
Congressional Bills Project data and the THOMAS subject search. The data set was combined and completed by
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chambers explore multiple dimensions of pharmaceutical policy over the course of the study.
Cost and safety receive the majority of attention in the House, compared to cost and importation
in the Senate. The House initiated minor activity concerning pharmaceutical policy from 1947 to
1968, focusing mainly on manufacturing and distribution until 1968. Most surprising is the low
level of activity around 1962, despite the focusing events associated with thalidomide and the
passage of the Kefauver-Harris drug amendments that resulted. Then again, low issue salience is
typical of a subsystem characterized by a dominant coalition, which the focus on manufacturing
and distribution seem to suggest is the case in the House (an impression the referral data
reinforce, as will become apparent in the following section).

Figure 1. Pharmaceutical Bill Content: House
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Figure 2. Pharmaceutical Bill Content: Senate
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Between 1968 and 1975 cost and safety became the primary focus of legislative
introductions in the House. The increased attention to cost, particularly in 1973, was in response
to the rising cost of intravenous and intramuscular prescription drugs furnished to Medicare
recipients in physicians’ offices—the result of a provision allowed under Medicare part B of the
Social Security Act, an amendment which went into effect in 1966 (Oliver et al. 2007, 12). 5
Virtually all cost legislation introduced from 1971 until the early 1990s concerned amending
prescription drug coverage of the Social Security Act. Safety introductions during this juncture
focused on bills to amend the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act (FD&C) due to rising
suspicion concerning cosmetic ingredients. Notably, in the early 1970s books were published
and newspapers ran cosmetic safety articles constantly on a variety of issues including “asbestos
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in baby talc,” and “hydrocarbons in hair sprays” (McEwen et al. 2000, 189). The single piece of
legislation to emerge in response to the safety bill introductions was Public Law 92-387, which
passed in 1971, amending the FD&C Act by imposing more stringent requirements for cosmetic
ingredient labeling, among other provisions.
The increased introductions regarding drug marketing from the early to mid-1970s are a
product of the Kefauver-Harris drug amendments. The drug amendments required drug
manufacturers to prove to the FDA the effectiveness of their products prior to marketing. The
requirements of the 1962 amendments resulted in conflict between the FDA, which was under
order from Congress to remove ineffective products, and the pharmaceutical industry which
preferred the pre-existing status-quo, moving subsystem politics into a more competitive mode
(Wardell et al. 2007, 193). Indeed, during this period Congress “conducted hearings that
regularly sought to expose problems with drug safety and alleged misconduct by the
pharmaceutical industry or the FDA (or often both)” (as reinforced in the following chapter)
(Wardell et al. 2007, 195). House legislative introductions decline from their dramatic highs in
the 1980s, when cost and safety receive the most attention. In 1990 cost and importation begin to
dominate the agenda prior to the passage of the Medicare Modernization Act (MMA) of 2003
when prescription drug costs increased by double digits and bill introductions again increase in
dramatic fashion.
Senate bill introductions follow a slightly different pattern than was the case in the
House. As was the case in the House, there is very little activity in the earliest years of the study,
indeed, little action occurs on the Senate legislative front through the 1990s. The focus between
1947 and 1970 is primarily on manufacturing and distribution and safety. Similar to activity in
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The disabled and persons with end stage renal disease were added to the Medicare program in 1972, which resulted
in a rapid increase in expenditures for prescription drugs furnished in physicians’ offices (Oliver et al. 2007, 12).
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the House, from 1973 to 1977, cost legislation increases in response to Medicare part B of the
Social Security Act. Although legislation related to prescription drug coverage in Medicare was
introduced and continued in subsequent years, the provisions “remained matters of heated debate
rather than legislation until 1988 when the Medicare Catastrophic Coverage Act was enacted,”
and later repealed (Oliver et al. 2007, 13).

Legislative introductions concerning the topic of

cost increased once again in the late 1980’s along with a focus on drug application review, the
availability of generic drugs, and re-importation restrictions.
As was the case in the House, introductions accelerate dramatically in the late 1990s,
with cost the dominant topic prior to the MMA of 2003. As noted in the historical analysis,
introductions concerning safety of pharmaceuticals increase in 2005 following the association of
selective serotonin reuptake inhibitors (SSRI) antidepressants in children with suicidal behavior
and withdrawal of COX-2 inhibitor drug rofecoxib from the market.
The increased legislative activity in both chambers appears to be both a product of
change in regulatory policy, and has in turn provoked more efforts to alter the regulatory
landscape. Thus, the initial surge in introductions is no doubt a product of the Medicare part B
program of the Social Security Act. The act was an effort to provide financial protection for the
elderly against the high cost of inpatient hospital care after retirement. Subsequent inclusion of
individuals under the age of 65 who were Social Security Disability Insurance beneficiaries and
individuals with end stage renal disease, to the Medicare program resulted in a dramatic increase
in expenditures for prescription drugs administered in the doctor’s office (Oliver et al. 2007, 13).
For example, from 1993 to 2001, these expenditures increased from 2.9 percent to 10 percent of
physician and clinical services expenditures (Oliver et al. 2007). As a result of the dramatic
price increases, reimportation of drugs from other countries entered as an option to get around
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the rising costs of prescription drugs (FDA 2006). If the 1965 act sparked increased
introductions, and an increasing focus on cost, one result was the passage of the Medicare
Prescription Drug Improvement and Modernization Act in 2003.
Clearly in both chambers legislative introductions cycle through a variety of concerns
associated with the drug industry. Two observations stand out. First, the focus over time is one in
which cost dominates the discussion. And second, increased bill introduction activity does not
always create a more varied discussion (as Baumgartner and Jones have found in the case of
hearings). For example, increased bill introductions in the House in the 1970s deal with
essentially two topics—safety and cost. On the other hand, the increase in introductions in the
1990s is associated with a wider variety of concerns on the agenda in both chambers.
Turf Control
Having mapped the prescription drug agenda, I now turn to the issue of jurisdictional
control. While a variety of studies have used hearing data to get a feel for congressional turf, I
track bill referrals as a first step towards tracking the institutional boundaries of the prescription
drug subsystem. As King (1997) has documented, controlling referrals is essential to a
committee intent on preserving turf. Thus, I am interested in determining whether there is a
change in legislative subject matter documented in the previous section and the identity of
committees to which legislation is referred. The preceding gives rise to the following
hypothesis:
Hypothesis 4.1: As bill referrals escape the policy domain, the image of pharmaceutical
policy changes—resulting in a competitive subsystem.
Figures 3 and 4 map the referral of legislation in the House and Senate, respectively. A
quick review of the figures reveals that the prescription drug policy domain in both chambers
varies between the dominant and competitive coalition scenarios. In the House the Commerce
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Committee enjoys virtually unchallenged status as the destination of legislation. The dominance
of Commerce gives way to two periods of competitive politics in the 1970s and the 1990s, in
which Ways and Means acts as a rival venue. Similarly, the committee on Health, Education,
Labor, and Pensions (and its various predecessors) dominates bill referrals in the Senate for most
of the time series. The exception is the period characterized by competition that begins in 1997
and continues to the present day, when the Finance committee actually serves as the dominant
destination for legislation. An explanation for this switch is the changing subject matter of
Senate legislation (figure 2), which is dominated by bills focused on prescription drug costs
(supporting hypothesis 4.1).
Still, I am left to wonder about the lack of such sustained competition in the House,
despite a similar shift in focus to costs. It appears that King’s (1997) observations regarding
Commerce, and its ability to hold onto and expand its turf, is borne out by the data.
Figure 3. House Bill Referrals
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Figure 4. Senate Bill Referrals
20
18
16

Number of Referrals

14
12
10
8
6
4
2
0
1947

1954

1963

1967

1971

1975

1979

1982

1985

1989

1992

1995

1999

2002

2005

Year
Commerce

Judiciary

Finance

Health

Veterans Affairs

Another means for getting a feel for jurisdictional control is through the construction of a
Herfindahl index. 6 A Herfindahl index score is calculated by squaring the proportion of
committees receiving referrals and then summing the squares of those proportions. The result is
an index score that ranges from zero to one, where a score close to zero indicates referrals are
spread out among a large number of committees, and a score of one indicates a single committee
receives all the referrals (Worsham, 2004). Indices were constructed for each year so as to offer a
longitudinal measure of referral competition in both chambers. As figures 5 and 6 reveal, both
chambers exhibit periods of perfect monopoly, which one would expect in a policy domain
characterized by dominant coalition politics. That said, the Senate has clearly become more

6

In keeping with others (Worsham, 2004) who have utilized the Herfindahl index to get at jurisdictional control, a
one is inserted for the years where no bill introductions or referrals were presented in order to reflect the lack of
competition on the agenda.
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competitive by the mid-1990s, whether the basis of comparison is referral activity in the House
or referrals in earlier Senate sessions.
Figure 5. Herfindahl Index: House Bill Referrals
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Figure 6. Herfindahl Index: Senate Bill Referrals
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Battles for jurisdictional control are influenced by the receipt of bill referrals (King 1997;
Talbert, et al. 1995). Further, claims of specialized knowledge and expertise influence the fate of
bill referrals. A review of figures 5 and 6 reveal as introductions increase competition increases.
Indicating outside committees are “gauging the position of other committees” (Talbert et al.
1995). I have established that the House Commerce and Senate Health committees have
maintained a policy monopoly over the referral of bills throughout most of the analysis period. I
have also discovered that mild competition and increased issue salience concerning
pharmaceutical cost occur from the mid-1990s to 2007—more so in the Senate than the House.
After running a correlation, as the number of introductions increase in the House, the level of
competition slightly decreases (.27). 7 Thus, the Commerce committee maintains its traditional
dominance, which is reflected in the House bill referrals (figure 3) and the corresponding
Herfindahl index (figure 5).
However, in the Senate, the Health committee is unable to maintain the same level of
control secured by the Commerce committee. As expected, as the number of introductions
increase the level of competition also increases. This moderate correlation (-0.33) is indicative
of the competition by the Finance committee. Therefore, the primary concern of the following
section is to identify if outsiders attempt to alter the venue in which pharmaceutical regulation is
considered.
Sponsorship and Committee Competition
I examine bill sponsorship in both chambers during the time period characteristic of mild
referral competition (1990-2007) in an effort to gauge whether representatives are introducing
bills to stake a claim to issues in the chamber (Wawro 2000). Using the Congressional Directory,

7

The direction of a correlation is reversed when using the herfindahl index. Thus, a negative correlation is
indicative of increased competition. Also, a correlation coefficient from 0 and 0.3 indicate a weak correlation, while
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the Congressional Bills Project, and the MIT Congressional Committee dataset 8 , I was able to
determine the percentage of bills sponsored by outsiders. Representatives not assigned to the
House Commerce or Senate Health committees are regarded as outsiders. The notion holds that
members of the House Commerce and Senate Health Committees are less likely to sponsor
legislation, which may alter the status quo. As such, I argue that attempts to alter the venue or
committee jurisdiction in which pharmaceutical regulation is considered should increase as one
moves from a dominant committee scenario to a more competitive environment. The preceding
gives rise to the following hypotheses:
Hypothesis 4.2: Outsiders, acting as entrepreneurs, will sponsor bills that escape referral
to the dominant committees.
Hypothesis 4.3: Insiders, controlling the agenda, will sponsor bills that are referred to
the dominant committees.
To begin, Table 4.1 contain the percentage of bills referred outside the Commerce
Committee. As indicated, there were 455 introductions in the House. Of the 455 introductions,
13% escaped referral to the Commerce Committee. Further, 50% of the introductions that
escape the Commerce Committee are sponsored by outsiders (offering support for hypothesis
4.2). Offering further evidence that representatives sponsor bills in an effort to stake a claim to a
policy issue, 78% of the bills sponsored by outsiders dealt with cost. The findings in Table 4.1
indicate that Commerce Committee members’ control over bill introductions slips under
competitive coalitions (offering support for hypothesis 4.1). Combine this with the effects of
salience, and it appears that as cost becomes the subject of increased attention, more and more
outsiders become involved in attempts to set the pharmaceutical agenda in Congress. Outsiders
are therefore attempting to alter the venue of the conflict under periods of competition.

0.3 and 0.7 indicate a moderate correlation (Ratner 2003).
8
Charles Stewart III and Jonathan Woon. Congressional Committee Assignments
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Table 4.1 House Bills Referred to Rival Committees from1990-2007

Year
1990
1991
1992
1993
1994
1995
1996
1997
1998
1999
2000
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
Total
Percentage

Total Bills

% Referred to Rival
Committees

% Sponsored by
Outsiders

22
43
8
24
0
7
0
17
0
15
28
7
18
10
10
15
6
5
58
13%

100
100
100
100
0
100
0
100
0
50
86
50
86
83
50
88
100
50
49
84%

9
14
12
17
7
14
16
24
19
27
25
28
39
59
20
54
31
40
455

Table 4.2 Senate Bills Referred to Rival Committees from 1990-2007

Year

Total Bills

1990
1991
1992
1993
1994
1995
1996
1997
1998
1999
2000
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
Total Number
Percentage

6
11
2
4
3
4
1
5
0
17
20
19
13
25
20
23
19
32
224

% Referred to Rival
Committees

% Referred to Finance
Committee

% Sponsored by
Outsiders

67
36
50
75
33
50
100
80
0
71
80
63
85
72
80
61
84
66
156
70%

67
36
50
75
33
25
0
40

67
36
50
75
33
50
100
80
0
29
70
53
62
56
70
52
68
56
128
82%

47
65
63
69
64
55
52
74
50
127
81%
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Table 4.2 contains the percentage of bills referred outside the Health Committee. As indicated,
there were 224 introductions in the Senate. Of the 224 introductions, 70% escaped referral to the
Health Committee. Further, 82% of the introductions that escape the Health Committee are
sponsored by outsiders (offering support for hypothesis 4.2). Offering further evidence that
representatives sponsor bills in an effort to stake a claim to a policy issue, 73% of the bills sponsored
by outsiders dealt with cost. The findings in Table 4.2 indicate the Health Committee members’
control over bill introductions slips under competitive coalitions (offering support for hypothesis
4.1). Similar to activity in the House (Table 4.1), it appears that as cost becomes the subject of
increased attention, more and more outsiders become involved in attempts to set the pharmaceutical
agenda in Congress. Based on the above data, outsiders in the Senate are even more aggressive in
attempting to alter the venue under periods of competition.
Next, Table 4.3 (House) and 4.4 (Senate) document the sponsorship of introductions assigned to
the House Commerce and Senate Health Committees from 1990-2007. As illustrated, members
within the Commerce and Health domain sponsor the bulk of bills assigned to the committee
compared to sponsors outside the domain (supporting hypothesis 4.3). For example, 97% in the
House, and 44% of Senate introductions referred to the committee are sponsored by committee
members. Only one importation proposal was introduced in the House and four in the Senate during
this period of competition. Based on the topic of the importation proposals, they were introduced by
both parties as a way to get around the high cost of prescription drugs in the United States.
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Table 4.3 House Introductions assigned to the House Commerce Committee from 1990-2007

Year

Total Bills

1990
1991
1992
1993
1994
1995
1996
1997
1998
1999
2000
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
Total
Percentage

9
14
12
17
7
14
16
24
19
27
25
28
39
59
20
54
31
40
455

% Referred to Commerce % Sponsored by Outsiders
78
57
92
76
100
93
100
83
100
85
72
93
82
90
90
85
94
95
397
87%

0
0
0
0
0
0
6
0
5
0
0
8
3
6
0
0
3
0
9
2%

Table 4.4 Senate Introductions assigned to the Senate Health Committee from 1990-2007
Year
1990
1991
1992
1993
1994
1995
1996
1997
1998
1999
2000
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
Total
Percentage

Total Bills
6
11
2
4
3
4
1
5
0
17
20
19
13
25
20
23
19
32
224

% Referred to Health % Referred to Finance
33
64
50
25
67
50
0
20
0
29
20
37
15
28
20
39
16
34
68
30%

67
36
50
75
33
25
0
40
47
65
63
69
64
55
52
74
50
128
57%

% Sponsored by Outsiders % Sponsored by Outsiders
(Assigned to Health)
(Assigned to Finance)
0
43
0
100
0
100
0
100
0
40
50
86
50
71
25
89
67
27
37
54%

67
36
50
75
33
25
0
40
0
18
55
53
54
48
50
43
63
41
104
81%
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Conclusion
This chapter illustrated which issues on the pharmaceutical agenda receive attention, and
where jurisdictional control and committee competition reside. The preceding analysis has
provided a first look at the congressional landscape in the realm of pharmaceutical regulation,
suggesting the domain is one in which negative feedback characterizes the policy process. Both
chambers have periods of subsystem politics typical of a dominant coalition, as well as sessions
characterized by competitive politics. In addition, by examining the sponsorship of policy
proposals, I find that policy entrepreneurs are attempting to alter the policy venue under periods
of competition.
In the early years, manufacturing and distribution was the main issue on the House
agenda, but cost and safety quickly become the primary focus of legislative introductions. In the
Senate, little activity occurs until cost legislation begins to dominate the agenda in the late 1990s.
The rise in attention on prescription drug costs was a result of double digit price increases.
While the majority of bill introductions that escape referral to the Commerce and Health
Committees were sponsored by members outside the policy domain, representatives of the
dominant committees sponsored the majority of proposals assigned to the committee. This
analysis suggests the period of mild referral competition is in part due to the issue framing of
policy entrepreneurs outside of the policy domain. The next chapter will further explore the
agenda setting participants by examining congressional hearings and the witnesses that show up
to the debate.
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5
Subsystem Political Variation & Congressional Hearings: Who Shows Up to the Debate?
“Hearings present multiple opportunities for strategic behavior by both committee members and
those testifying.” – Diermeier and Feddersen, 2000, 52
The previous chapter examined the rise and fall of pharmaceutical bill introductions in
both chambers, including an examination of the topics that received the most attention. My
analysis suggests the period of mild referral competition identified by examining bill
introductions is partly due to the issue framing of policy entrepreneurs outside of the policy
domain. This chapter broadens the investigation to include an examination of hearing activity,
the composition of committees holding hearings, and tracks who shows up at hearings. This
approach allows me to say something more definitive about the policy subsystem, as well as
offer a more nuanced measure of subsystem political variation.
Many bills are introduced for symbolic purposes—as a way for members to gain
constituency support (Wilkerson, Feeley, Schiereck, and Sue 2002, 255). A hearing on the other
hand is less common, as the congressional agenda is necessarily limited (Talber and Potoski,
2002, 189). Congressional committees can acquire information in several ways, but hearings
serve as fact-finding exercises—a way to publicize an issue, assess the level of support or
opposition to a bill, or investigate new problems or issues (Oleszek 1996, 109-12; Hardin 2002,
98).
First, I assess the overall level of hearing activity in both chambers. The overall level of
activity will provide a general understanding of the attention Congress gives to pharmaceutical
regulation. Hearings, as compared to bill introductions, indicate a higher level of agenda status
(Kingdon 1984, 186; Worsham 1997). Similar to the analysis of bill introductions, a longitudinal
approach highlights whether a change in activity corresponds to a punctuating event. Second, I
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examine policy jurisdiction and policy monopoly to further track the institutional boundaries of
the prescription drug subsystem. I provide data regarding the committee or committees holding
hearings and whether activity changes due to external events. Third, the topic of the hearings
and the witnesses testifying have shown to influence the nature and extent of information
acquired (Hardin 2002). Tracking the type of witnesses participating in the hearings allows me
to determine who tends to dominate the discussion. These two dimensions of hearings
information are examined in order to assess how pharmaceutical regulation and congressional
activity have evolved.
An Assessment of Hearing Activity
Like others who have tracked agenda control with a focus on hearing activity
(Baumgartner and Jones 1993; Worsham 1997; Hardin, 2002; Hunt 2002; Wilkerson et al.,
2002), I focus my analysis on congressional hearings addressing pharmaceutical regulation in
order to identify the set of interests active in the pharmaceutical policy domain. The data on
congressional hearings were gathered utilizing the Congressional Information Service (CIS)
Index to Committee Hearings (available online through Lexis-Nexis Congressional). Following
a review of the Index to Committee Hearings, the congressional hearings data were gathered
using the search terms “Pharmacists and Pharmacy,” or “Pharmaceutical Industry.” The LexisNexis Congressional data yielded 352 hearings, 172 in the House and 180 in the Senate for the
years 1947 to 2007.
I begin with an exercise that maps hearing activity in each legislative chamber over the
course of the study, providing a feel for variation in policy salience over time in each chamber. I
then move to identify the committees holding hearings in an effort to get a feel for turf control in
each chamber. The third part of the paper tracks the changing focus of pharmaceutical regulation
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over time allowing me to say something about how a change in venue alters the focus of
discussion. Finally, I end with an examination of who shows up at hearings, which allows me to
say something about which venues favor particular interests, shedding further light on how
interests and venues alter policy focus.
Figure 1 tracks hearing activity in both the House and the Senate between 1947 and 2007.
The level of activity is similar in both chambers until 1960, when Senate hearings increase
dramatically prior to the passage of the 1962 Kefauver Amendments to the Pure Food and Drug
Act. It appears that Senator Kefauver’s (D-TN) initial role as an entrepreneur set the Senate up
as the venue to consider pharmaceutical policy, even after his death in 1963. As the figure
indicates, there is more sustained hearing activity in the Senate than in the House through the
1970s. Hearing activity increases in both chambers beginning in the mid-1960s, falling off a bit
in the 1980s, and picking up again in the 1990s, when the House becomes the more active
chamber. This increased level of activity in the House corresponds with the emergence of
concern over the availability of generic drugs and re-importation restrictions. Activity in both
chambers increases as a response to President Clinton’s proposed plan for a voluntary outpatient
prescription drug benefit in 1999 and continues with the enactment of President Bush’s 2003
Medicare Prescription Drug Improvement and Modernization Act.
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Figure 1. Pharmaceutical Policy Hearings, 1947-2007
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Policy Jurisdiction and Committee Competition
Figures 2 and 3 identify the committees that held hearings in the House and Senate,
respectively. As the institutional anchor of subsystem arrangements, committees utilize hearings
to protect or extend their policy turf (Baumgartner and Jones 1993; Hardin 2002; Worsham
2006). A review of figure 2 reveals that the Government Reform and Commerce committees
serve as the dominant venues in the House. Competition from other venues increases beginning
in 1981, although there are still periods (e.g., 1996-2000, 2003-2007) in which Commerce and
Government Reform manage to sustain an oligopoly of sorts. The more competitive periods, it
appears, are associated with attempts to stake a claim to access and cost issues influencing small
businesses as well as issues related to access and the aged (see below).
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Figure 2: House Hearings: Committee Competition
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Figure 3: Senate Hearings: Committee Competition
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A review of figure 3 suggests there is more competition, or at least venue shifting, in the
Senate than was the case in the House. While Health, Education and Labor (and its various
predecessors) is a nearly ubiquitous presence from 1974 onward, no single committee or pair of
committees dominates the discussion like Commerce and Government Reform do in the House.
Instead, pharmacy policy in the Senate starts out with the Judiciary Committee in charge, moves
to a brief period in which Governmental Affairs monopolizes the discussion (1962-1965),
followed by an interval in which Small Business dominates (1968-1974), followed by a turf
sharing arrangement involving Small Business and Health, Education, and Labor which lasts
through 1980, after which the system seems to settle into a period of prolonged competition.
Associated with the move from a system characterized by a policy monopoly to one
characterized by competition is a loosening of subsystem control over the predominant image
underlying the policy equilibrium (Worsham 2006, 442). To get at this phenomenon, the topic of
hearings were coded and placed into one of six categories. When a hearing entails more than one
topic, the predominant or most occurring topic is coded based on a reading of the textual
summary and title. Hearings coded Safety include those dealing with the general safety and or
effectiveness of pharmaceutical products. An example is a hearing to authorize the Federal
Security Agency to issue subpoenas in food and drug product safety investigations.
Manufacturing and Distribution include hearings to amend the Federal Food, Drug, and
Cosmetic Act relating to the distribution chain of prescription drugs.
Drug Marketing includes hearings that discuss drug marketing, licensing, labeling, and
advertising. Access includes hearings that focus on increasing access to certain populations, such
as veterans and Medicare or Medicaid recipients or hearings that focus on competition limiting
access to drugs. Cost contains hearings that specifically seek to address efforts to increase the
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affordability of prescription drugs. Importation includes hearings that discuss the intent to
modify the law to allow importation from designated countries, restrict importations, discussions
concerning the regulation of internet pharmacies, and exportation provisions. The final category,
Other, is a catch-all for hearings that do not fit the other six categories.
Figure 4: Pharmaceutical Hearing Content: House
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Figure 5: Pharmaceutical Hearing Content: Senate
14

12

Number of Hearings

10

8

6

4

2

07
20

20

05

03
20

01
20

94

92

99
19

19

19

90
19

86

88
19

84
19

19

80
19

78
19

74

72

76
19

19

19

70
19

68
19

63

61

66
19

19

19

56
19

19

49

0

Year

Access

Cost

Drug Marketing

Importation

Manufacturing & Distribution

Other

Safety

A review of figure 4 reveals that while House pharmaceutical hearings are often focused
on safety between 1947 and 1980, there are periods in which cost, access, and manufacturing and
distribution dominate the discussion. Access becomes a regular topic of discussion in the late
1970s and is firmly enmeshed by the mid-80s in response to demonstrations from patient
populations requesting access to investigational drugs. Although the discussion of access
remains salient through 2007, competition for agenda space characterizes the period from 1990
onward. In the Senate (figure 5) access is a topic of discussion throughout the time series, at
times dominating the discussion (between 1968 and 1972), at other times in competition with
other issues.
The focus of pharmaceutical hearing content differs from that of pharmaceutical bill
content for the same period in the same chamber. Bill content in the House from 1947 to 1968
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focused on manufacturing and distribution followed by a period until 1975 where cost and safety
become the primary focus of legislative introductions in the House. Followed by increased
attention to cost and importation beginning in 1990. The Senate bill introductions vary slightly
with little action occurring in the Senate through the 1990s. Between 1947 and 1970
manufacturing and distribution and safety receive the majority of attention. Following this
period cost legislation increases in response to Medicare part B of the Social Security Act.
What causes the shift in focus in the pharmaceutical policy domain? Baumgartner, Jones
and MacLeod (2000) suggest committee competition can induce a shift in the dominant image
associated with a policy domain. In a first effort at getting how competition effects the topic of
hearings I constructed Herfindahl indices for the House and Senate (figures 6 and 7). 9 A review
of figures 6 and 7 reveals that both chambers exhibit periods of near perfect monopoly through
the 1960s, with the House period lasting well into the 1980s. Competition becomes a regular
feature of the Senate policy domain in the late 1960s, while the House holds out until the early
1980s. Comparing committee competition with the content of hearings suggests some evidence
to support the proposition that as more committees become involved in the discussion, more
topics come to occupy agenda space.

9

A Herfindahl index score is calculated by squaring the proportion of committees holding hearings and then summing the
squares of those proportions. The result is an index score that ranges from zero to one, where a score close to zero indicates
hearings are spread out among a large number of committees, and a score of one indicates a single committee holds the majority
of hearings (Baumgartner, Jones and MacLeod 2000; Worsham, 2006). Indices were constructed for each year so as to offer a
longitudinal measure of committee competition in both chambers.
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Figure 6: Herfindahl Index: House Hearings
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Figure 7: Herfindahl Index: Senate Hearings

1

0.9

0.8

0.7

0.6

0.5

0.4

0.3

0.2

0.1

0

Year

92

Witness Participation: Who Shows Up to the Debate?
Another explanation for change in policy focus has to do with the identity of interests at
the policy “table.” If congressional committees serve as the legislative anchor for subsystems and
hearings allow the actors within the subsystem to negotiate over the distribution of resources,
then who shows up at hearings has something to do with who gets policy benefits when it comes
time to implement policy. An examination of witness participation provides an opportunity to
pinpoint the key players involved in problem recognition and agenda setting. The witnesses that
appear are thus an indicator of the interests that are viewed as legitimate to key players on the
committee (Baumgartner and Jones 1993; Worsham 2006).
The identity of witnesses was determined by using the Congressional Information
Service (CIS) Abstracts to Committee Hearings (available online through Lexis-Nexis
Congressional). The Abstracts identify the group and membership association of most witnesses.
In the event a witness appeared from the general population without an institutional affiliation
the witness was coded as a Consumer. All witnesses were placed into one of five categories. The
Drug Industry category includes anyone with a connection to the pharmaceutical manufacturing
and distribution industry. Witnesses in this category include Pfizer, Wyeth, other large industry
firms, the Pharmaceutical Research and Manufacturers Association, chemist, druggist, and
pharmacist, as well as retail pharmacies. The second category, Medical Industry, includes any
witness associated with a hospital or hospital association, the American Medical Association,
physicians and similar. The Government category includes state or federal level officials, elected
and non-elected, as well as government agencies such as the Food and Drug Administration.
The fourth category, Academics, includes witnesses associated with academic institutions and the
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final category, Consumer, represents witnesses from consumer groups, such as AARP, and those
without an institutional affiliation.
Figure 8: House Pharmaceutical Witnesses, 1947-2007
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Figure 9: Senate Pharmaceutical Witnesses, 1947-2007
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Overall, I coded a total of 3,542 witnesses, 1,843 in the House and 1,699 in the Senate.
Review of figures 8 and 9 suggest the pharmaceutical industry and medical communities are a
consistent presence at hearings. In the House (figure 8), government officials are a regular player
in the 1960s, 1990s, and after 2000. Compare this to the Senate (figure 9), where they become
entrenched in the 1970s, and then seem to drop off the map until after 2000. Consumers are
conspicuous by their absence (although one might argue that at least some government officials
are acting as representatives of the public interest). Indeed, consumers do not enjoy a sustained
presence until the 1990s, when they become regular players in both chambers. The role of
academics seems to mirror that of consumers. What is apparent from both figures is the
increased proportion of non-pharmaceutical, non-medical interests at hearings beginning in the
1990s.
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In order to get a feel for how a change in venue effects witnesses, Table 1 compares the
mix of witnesses appearing at select venues in the House and Senate. Recall from the previous
discussion that Commerce and Government Reform were the major players in the House, while
the Health and Judiciary committees were among the regular venues in the Senate. I am
interested in seeing if a change in venue results in a change in the composition of witnesses, and
by inference, a change in policy focus and outcomes.
As table 1 indicates, a move from Commerce to Government Reform in the House
involves a significant alteration in the role of representatives from both the drug industry and
medical community at hearings. Staying with the House, it also appears that the Government
Reform Committee prefers to hear from public sector actors when considering pharmaceutical
policy. While a change in venue does not have as dramatic an effect in the Senate, the drug
industry does do better at Judiciary and Health hearings, than it does when another committee
claims a piece of the policy turf. It also appears that Judiciary is not as keen on hearing from
public sector actors in the Senate than are other committees.
Table 5.1 The Correspondence between Committee Venue and Witnesses Appearing at Hearings
in Pharmaceutical Policy, 1947 – 2007
House Committees
Commerce
Government Reform
Other
Total

Drug Industry
32
12
26
27

Government
31
51
27
32

Type of Witnesses
Medical Industry Consumer
20
12
12
16
22
13
20
13

Academics
6
9
12
8

Total (N)
100 (980)
100 (249)
100 (614)
100 (1843)

11
12
21
16

100 (505)
100 (335)
100 (859)
100 (1699)

Senate Committees
Health
Judiciary
Other

27
34
17
Total
23
Note: Figures are the percentage of witnesses.

33
20
33
30

18
23
22
21

12
10
7
9
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Conclusion
My review of the pharmaceutical policy agenda, which includes an examination of
hearing activity, the identity of committees holding hearings, and the identity of witnesses,
reveals that the 1990s appear to have ushered in a period of competitive coalitions in
pharmaceutical policy, in that the policy domain is characterized by multiple committees holding
hearings. Further, as the system moves from one characterized by a policy monopoly or
oligopoly, to one characterized by competition, the focus of hearings shifts to previously
neglected policy dimensions.
Finally, while the drug and medical industries represent the bulk of participants through
out the time frame under consideration, government players emerge as important actors in both
the 1970s and after 1990, when they are joined by consumer interests. What this suggests is the
changing identity of institutional players is associated with variation in the identity of interests
and an increase in the variety of issues considered in the pharmaceutical policy domain. Whether
the end result is meaningful policy change, only time will tell. The next chapter provides a
summary of my findings, the research contribution, and ideas for further analysis.
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6
Conclusion
“If institutions are often created and reorganized during periods of heightened attention to a
given problem, they do not disappear when public concern dies away; rather, they may be the
most important legacies of agenda access”- Frank Baumgartner and Bryan Jones (2002, 24)
I began this study with three objectives. First, was to understand how Congress governed
the pharmaceutical policy agenda over the post-war period. Second, was to determine if periods
of agenda access led to venue changes in pharmaceutical regulation, and third, to gain insight as
to whether the image of pharmaceutical policies led to positive or negative feedback, and if so,
what factors precipitated such change. In seeking to accomplish these objectives, I have utilized
three qualifiers: (1) congressional committees as the venue of focus, (2) bill introductions and (3)
hearings as the measures of agenda status and governmental attention. Congressional
committees were selected because they are the legislative anchor for subsystem arrangements
(Worsham 2004; Baumgartner and Jones 1993).
So what does my research illustrate regarding agenda setting and pharmaceutical policy?
First, political entrepreneurs must be engaged to stoke the political fires (Eyestone 1978, 2).
Players of the agenda setting process on the inside and outside of government were instrumental
in framing how pharmaceutics have been defined over the past century. The agenda setting
process is dynamic and inherently political. The pharmaceutical subsystem is one that fluctuated
between dominant and competitive scenarios partly due to external events that challenged the
subsystem power brokers. As the subsystem cycles over time, interest group participation,
agenda control, and public policy are impacted (Worsham 1998). What I have found is that the
multidimensional nature of U.S. pharmaceutical policy created opportunities for competing
policy venues to challenge the dominant subsystem. For example, in the House the Commerce
Committee enjoyed virtually unchallenged status as the destination of legislation. The dominance
98

of Commerce gives way to two periods of competitive politics in the 1970s and the 1990s, in
which Ways and Means acts as a rival venue. Similarly, the committee on Health, Education,
Labor, and Pensions (and its various predecessors) dominated bill referrals in the Senate for most
of the time series. The exception is the period characterized by competition that begins in 1997
and continues to the present day, when the Finance committee actually serves as the dominant
destination for legislation. As bills escaped the policy domain the image of pharmaceutical
policy changed—leading to a more competitive system.
When the policy equilibria maintained by the dominant coalition is disrupted by focusing
events, the emergence of previously excluded interests enter the debate. Thus, there is more
competition, or at least venue shifting, in the Senate than was the case in the House. Pharmacy
policy in the Senate starts out with the Judiciary Committee in charge, moves to a brief period in
which Governmental Affairs monopolizes the discussion (1962-1965), followed by an interval in
which Small Business dominates (1968-1974), followed by a turf sharing arrangement involving
Small Business and Health, Education, and Labor which lasts through 1980, after which the
system seems to settle into a period of prolonged competition. Associated with the move from a
system characterized by a policy monopoly to one characterized by competition is a loosening of
subsystem control over the predominant image underlying the policy equilibrium (Worsham
2006, 442).
As illustrated in the historical description, as competition increased the image of
pharmaceutical policy changed from one of safety to that of safety and efficacy, and finally to
one of access and accommodation. This change occurred due to the skillful political
maneuvering of several key policy entrepreneurs and the intense pressure of outside actors.
According to Baumgartner and Jones, a subsystem-induced equilibrium is subject to radical
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change during certain periods of time in response to an increased interest in the policy area. The
pharmaceutical policy story supports the notion of a punctuated equilibrium model. Periods of
heightened salience are accompanied by an increase in the variety of interest groups and
institutional players involved in pharmaceutical policy. Yet, the subsystem arrangement is not
radically changed. As suggested by Worsham (1997), the subsystem wavers, allowing outsiders
to participate without a dramatic restructuring. This study demonstrates that outsiders can make
a difference in policy outcomes and provides indicators for when change is likely to occur.
Further, the development of the pharmaceutical industry seems to be a prerequisite to regulation
and subsystem formation, not unlike that which occurs in agriculture (see Carpenter, 2001).
Mastering technological change is a key component of the subsystem, and may possibly be a
prerequisite to its formation--further explaining change in policy dynamics.
Aside from the approach I have taken in this study, there are additional venues and
perspectives worth exploring for future research. At the micro-level, focusing on whether the
civil service within the FDA is responsive would provide insight concerning their degree of
argumentation (Golden 2000, 168). Does the civil service of the FDA challenge policy
directives or enter the fray of the policy debate? If not, does it matter? Such an analysis would
provide further information regarding the role we want civil servants to play in the political
system. Another direction for exploration could originate at the state and local level. An
evaluation of how pharmaceutical policies diffuse across states and influence federal dialogues is
an interesting area for further exploration (Manna 2006). Finally, examining the impact of
globalization on pharmaceutical policy outcomes would provide insight concerning how the
reduction of trade barriers may impact pharmaceutical policy in industrialized countries
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(Daemmrich 2004). In short, the congressional approach utilized for this research is only one
strategy for exploring the dynamic evolution of pharmaceutical policy.

101

References
Drug Importation Policy: Current Laws and Issues for Debate. 2003. Congressional Digest.
Pharmaceutical Industry Profile 2008 2008. Pharmaceutical Research and Manufacturers of
America March 2008 [cited July 2008]. Available from
http://www.phrma.org/files/2008%20Profile.pdf
Administration, Food and Drug. 2007. FDA Backgrounder 1999 [cited June 2007]. Available
from www.fda.gov/opacom/backgrounders/miles.html.
———. 2007. Counterfeit drugs questions and answers. 2004 [cited February 2007]. Available
from www.fda.gov/oc/initiatives/counterfeit/qa.html.
———. 2007. FDA Centennial at CDER 2006 [cited May 2007]. Available from
www.fda.gov/cder/centennial/timeline.htm
———. 2008. PDUFA IV 2008 [cited December 2008]. Available from
http://www.fda.gov/oc/pdufa/default.ht.
Adolino, Jessica R., and Charles H. Blake. 2001. Comparing Public Policies: Issues and Choices
in Six Industrialized Countries: Washington D.C., CQ Press
Ahmad, Syed Rizwanuddin. 2007. Evolution of the FDA Drug Approval Process. In Handbook
of Pharmaceutical Public Policy, edited by T. R. Fulda and A. I. Wertheimer. New York:
Pharmaecutical Products Press.
Ahuja, Sunil, and Robert Dewhirst. 2003. Congress Responds in the Twentieth Century. In
Congress Responds to the Twentieth Century, edited by S. Ahuja and R. Dewhirst.
Columbus: The Ohio State University Press.
Anderson, James E. 1997. Public Policymaking: An Introduction: Boston, Houghton Mifflin
Company.
Anderson, Oscar E. 1958. The Health Of A Nation: Harvey W. Wiley and the Fight for Pure
Food. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press.
Angell, Marcia 2004. The Truth About the Drug Companies. New York: Random House.
Babbie, Earl. 1998. The Practice of Social Research. Belmont: Wadsworth Publishing Company.
Bailey, Thomas A. 1930. Congressional opposition to pure food legislation. American Journal of
Sociology 36 (1):56-64.
Balough, Brian. 1991. chain Reaction. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Baumgartner, Frank, and Bryan D. Jones. 1991. Agenda Dynamics and Policy Subsystems. The
Journal of Politics 53 (4):1044-1074.
———. 1993. Agendas and Instability in American Politics.
: Chicago, The University of Chicago Press.
———, eds. 2002. Policy Dynamics.
: Chicago, The University of Chicago Press.
———. 2005. The Politics of Attention: How Government Prioritizes Problems.
: Chicago, The University of Chicago Press.
Benjamin, Georges, C., and Richard Levinson. 2004. Importing Drugs: A viable Solution? The
Physician Executive.
Bernstein, Marver H. 1955. Regulating Business by Independent Commission. Princeton:
Princeton University Press.
Boehm, Charles. 2005. Canada Moves to Shut Rx Pipeline. RevolutioN, July-August 2005, 4-5.
Bosso, Christopher J. 1987. Pesticides and Politics: Theh Life Cycle of a Public Issue.
Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press.
102

Campbell, John L. 1988. Collapse of an Industry: Nuclear Power and the Contradictions of U.S.
Policy. Ithaca: Cornell University Press.
Carpenter, Daniel P. 2001. The Forging of Bureaucratic Autonomy. Princeton: Princeton
University Press.
Cater, Douglas. 1964. Power in Washington. New York: Random House.
Cavers, David F. 1939. The Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act of 1938: Its Legislative History and
Its Substantive Provisions. Law and Contemporary Problems 6 (1):2-42.
Ceccoli, Stephen J. 2003. Policy Punctuations and Regulatory Drug Review. The Journal of
Policy History 15 (2).
———. 2004. Pill Politics: Drugs and the FDA. London: Lynne Rienner.
Choudhry, Niteesh K., and Allan S. Detsky. 2005. A Perspective on US Drug Importation. The
Journal of American Medical Association 293 (3):358-362.
Cobb, Roger W., and Charles D. Elder. 1972. Participation in American Politics: The Dynamics
of Agenda-Building.
: Baltimore, The John Hopkins University Press.
Cook, Fay Lomax, Tom R. Tyler, Edward G. Goetz, Margaret T. Gordon, David Protess, Donna
R. Leff, and Harvey L. Molotch. 1983. Media and Agenda Setting: Effects on the Public,
Interest Group Leaders, Policy Makers, and Policy. The Public Opinion Quarterly 47
(1):16-35.
Daemmrich, Arthur A. 2004. Pharmacopolitics: Drug Regulation in the United States and
Germany: Chapel Hill, The University of North Carolina Press.
Davidson, Roger H., and Walter J. Oleszek. 2005. Congress and Its Members. Washington,
D.C.: CQ Press.
Davolt, Steve. 2005. States and U.S. Face Off. Employee Benefit News, 65.
Dearing, James W., and Everett M. Rogers. 1996. Agenda-Setting: Thousand Oaks, Sage
Publications.
Denhardt, Robert B., and Joseph W. Grubbs. 2003. Public Administration: An Action
Orientation: Belmont, Thomson Wadsworth.
Eisner, Marc Allen. 1993. Regulatory Politics in Transition. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins
University Press.
Eyestone, Robert. 1978. From Social Issues to Public Policy. New York: John Wiley & Sons,
Inc. .
Fenno, Richard F. 1973. Congressmen in Committees. Boston: Little Brown.
———. 1973. Congressmen in Committees: A Comparative View. Boston: Little, Brown.
Fiorina, Morris P. 1977. Congress: Keystone of the Washington Establishment. New Haven:
Yale University Press.
Freeman, Lieper J. 1965. The Political Process. Revised Edition ed. New York: Random House.
Freeman, Leiper J. 1955, 1965. The Political Process. New York: Random House.
Gokcekus, Omer, Mike Adams, Henry Grabowski, and Edward Tower. 2006. How Did the 2003
Prescription Drug Re-Importation Bill Pass the House? Economics and Politics 18
(1):27-45.
Golden, Marissa Martino. 2000. What Motivates Bureaucrats? Politics and Administration
During The Reagan Years. New York, Columbia University Press.
Gonzales, Gloria. 2005. Canada Cracks Down on Bulk Drug Exports. Business Insurance, 3.
Grabowski, Henry G., and John M. Vernon. 1983. The Regulation of Pharmaceuticals:
Balancing the Benefits and Risks. Washington: American Enterprise Institute
103

Greenberg, RB. 1988. The Prescription Drug Marketing Act of 1987. American Journal of
Hospital Pharmacy 45 (10):2118-26.
Griffith, Ernest S. 1939. The Impasse of Democracy. New York: Harrison Hilton Books.
Gross, David J. 2007. Medicare's Prescription Drug Benefit. In Handbook of Pharmaceutical
Public Policy, edited by T. R. Fulda and A. I. Wertheimer. New York: Pharmaecutical
Products Press.
Guglielmo, Wayne J. 2005. Where does drug importation stand now? Medical Economics 6:42,
44, 46.
Hardin, John 1998. Multiple topics, multiple targets, multiple goals, and multiple decisionmakers: Congressional consideration of health care reform. In Policy Dynamics, edited
by F. Baumgartner and B. Jones. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
Hardin, John W. 2002. Multiple Topics, Multiple Targets, Multiple Goals, and Multiple Decision
Makers: Congressional Consideration of Comprehensive Health Care Reform. In Policy
Dynamics, edited by F. Baumgartner and B. D. Jones.
: Chicago, The University of Chicago Press.
Heclo, Hugh. 1994. Ideas, Interests, and Institutions. In The Dynamics of American Politics:
Approaches and Interpretations, edited by C. D. Lawrence and J. Calvin. Boulder:
Westview Press.
High, Jack, and Clayton A. Coppin. 1988. Wiley and the Whiskey Industry: Strategic Behavior
in the Passage of the Pure Food Act. The Business History Review 62 (2):286-309.
Hilts, Philip J. 2003. Protecting America's Health. New York: Alfred A. Knopf.
Howlett, Michael, and M. Ramesh. 1995. Studying Public Policy: Policy Cycles and Policy
Subsystems.
: Toronto, Oxford University Press.
Hunt, Valerie F. 2002. The Multiple and Changing Goals of Immigration Reform: A Comparison
of House and Senate Activity, 1947-1993. In Policy Dynamics, edited by F. Baumgartner
and B. D. Jones. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press.
Importation, HHS Task Force on Drug. December 2004. Report on Prescription Drug
Importation: Department of Health and Human Services.
Ismail, A. 2005. Prescription for Power: Drug Makers' Lobbying Army Ensures Their
Legislative Dominance. The Center for Public Integrity.
Iyengar, Shanto, and Donald R. Kinder. 1987. New that Matters: Chicago, The University of
Chicago Press.
Jackson, Charles O. 1970. Food and Drug Legislation in The New Deal. Princeton: Princeton
University Press.
Jones, Bryan, Frank Baumgartner, and Jeffrey Talbert. 1993. The Destruction of Issue
Monopolies in Congress. American Political Science Review 87 (September):657-671.
Jones, Bryan D. 2001. Politics and the Architecture of Choice: Bounded Rationality and
Governance.
: Chicago, The University of Chicago Press.
Jones, Charles O. 1984. An Introduction to the Study of Public Policy. Monterey: Brooks/Cole
Publishing Company.
King, David C. 1994. The Nature of Congressional Committee Jurisdictions. American Political
Science Review 88 (1):48-62.
———. 1997. Turf Wars: How Congressional Committees Claim Jurisdiction.
: Chicago, The University of Chicago Press.
104

Kingdon, John W. 1995. Agendas, Alternatives, and Public Policies. New York: LongmanAddison-Wesley Educational Publishers, Inc.
Krehbiel, Keith. 1991. Information and Legislative Organization. Ann Arbor: University of
Michigan Press.
Krisberg, Kim. 2005. Drug Importation Risky, Costly to Regulate. Nation's Health, 1-26.
Latham, Stephen R. 2003. Pharmaceutical Costs: An Overivew and Analysis of Legal and Policy
Responses by the States. The Journal of Legal Medicine 24:141-173.
Law, Marc. 2004. History of Food and Drug Regulation in the United States.
http://eh.net/encyclopedia/article/Law.Food.and.Drug.Regulation.
Light, Paul C. 1999. The President's Agenda. Baltimore The Johns Hopkins University Press.
Lipowski, Earlene, and Patrick McKercher. 2007. Structure and Dynamics of the Pharmaceutical
Industry. In Handbook of Pharmaceutical Public Policy, edited by T. R. Fulda and A. I.
Wertheimer. New York: Pharmaceutical Products Press.
Long, Norton. 1962. The Polity. Chicago: Rand McNally.
Lowi, Theodore J. 1969, 1979. The End of Liberalism. New York: W.W. Norton.
Maass, Arthur A. 1951. Muddy Waters. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
Mamudi, Sam. 2005. U.S. Leans Toward Drug Imports. Managing Intellectual Property, 8.
Mayhew, David R. 1974. Congress: The Electoral Connection: New Haven, Yale University
Press.
McCombs, Maxwell E., and D.L. Shaw. 1972. The agenda-setting function of mass media.
Public Opinion Quarterly 36 (2):176-187.
McCool, Daniel. 1998. The Subsystem Family of Concepts: A Critique and a Proposal. Political
Research Quarterly 51 (2):551-570.
McEwen, Gerald N. Jr., Mark A. Pollak, and Norman F. Estrin. 2000. Voluntary Self Regulation:
A Case Study. In Cosmetic Regulation in a Competitive Environment, edited by N. F.
Estrin and J. M. Akerson. New York: Marcel Dekker, Inc.
Meier, Kenneth J. 1985. Regulation: Politics, Bureaucracy, and Economics. New York: St.
Martin's Press.
Melnitzer, Julius. 2005. Drug Imports Face Regualtory, Legislative Challenges. Corporate Legal
Times, December 2005, 56-57.
Miller, Joanne M., and Jon A. Krosnick. 2000. News Media Impact on the Ingredients of
Presidential Evaluations: Politically Knowledgeable Citizens Are Guided by a Trusted
Source. American Journal of Political Science 44 (2):295-309.
Moken, Merri C. 2003. Fake Pharmaceuticals: How They and Relevant Legislation or Lack
Thereof Contribute to Consistently High and Increasing Drug Prices. American Journal
of Law and Medicine 29:525-542.
Mucciaroni, Gary. 1995. Reversals of Fortune: Public Policy and Private Interests. Washington,
D.C.: The Brookings Institution.
Neustadt, Richard E. 1990. Presidential Power and The Modern Presidents: New York, The
Free Press.
Okie, Susan. 2005. What Ails the FDA? New England Journal of Medicine 352 (11).
Oliver, Thomas R., Philip R. Lee, and Helene L. Lipton. 2004. A Political History of Medicare
and Prescription Drug Coverage. The Milbank Quarterly 82 (2):283-354.
Oliver, Thomas R., Philip R. Lee, Sarah B. Schulman, Susan P. Canny, and Helene L. Lipton.
2007. The Political Evoloution of Medicareand Prescription Drug Coverage. In
Handbook of Pharmaceutical Public Policy edited by T. R. Fulda and A. I. Wertheimer.
105

New York: Pharmaecutical Products Press.
Olson, Mancur 1971. The Logic of Collective Action: Public Goods and The Theory of Groups:
Massachusetts, Harvard University Press.
Openshaw, Matthew S. 2005. The Economics of Prescription Drug Prices, Government
Intervention, and the Importation of Drugs from Canada. Nursing Economics 23 (6):307311.
Ornes, Lynne, and Thomas J. Hendrix. 2006. Prescription Drug Re-Importation: A Balanced
Look. Journal of Gerontological Nursing:15-19.
Parekh, Rupal. 2005. Foreign Drugs Pose Health Risks, HHS Report Says. Business Insurance,
1-17.
———. 2005. Rx Reimporters Fear Canada Plans to Cut Off U.S. Drug Supply. Business
Insurance, 1-18.
Pecorino, Paul. 2002. Should the US allow prescription drug reimports from Canada? Journal of
Health Economics 21:699-708.
Ratner, B. 2003. Statistical Modeling and Analysis for Database Marketing: Effective
Techniques. Boca Raton: CRC Press.
Rhode, David W. 2005. Committees and Policy Formulation. In The Legislative Branch, edited
by P. J. Quirk and S. A. Binder. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Riker, William H. 1980. Implications from the Disequilibrium of Majority Rule for the Study of
Institutions. American Political Science Review 74:432-446.
Ringquist, Evan J., Jeffrey Worsham, and Marc Allen Eisner. 2003. Salience, Complexity, and
the Legislative Direction of Regulatory Bureaucracies. Journal of Public
Admministration Research and Theory April (13):141-164.
Ripley, Randall B. 1985. Policy Analysis in Political Science. Chicago: Nelson-Hall Publishers.
Ripley, Randall B., and Grace A. Franklin. 1980. Congress, the Burecaucracy, and Public
Policy. Homewood: The Dorsey Press.
Rochefort, David A., and Roger W. Cobb. 1994. The Politics of Problem Definition: Shaping the
Policy Agenda. Kansas: University Press of Kansas.
Sabatier, Paul A., and Hank C. Jenkins-Smith. 1993. Policy Change and Learning: An Advocacy
Coalition Approach. Boudler, Colorado: Westview Press.
———. 1999. The Advocacy Coalition Framework: An Assessment. In Theories of the Policy
Process, edited by P. A. Sabatier. Boulder: Westview Press.
Scher, Seymour. 1960. Congressional Committee Members as Independent Agency Overseers: A
Case Study. American Political Science Review 54:911-920.
Scherer, F. M. 1993. Pricing, Profits, and Technological Progress in the Pharmaceutical Industry.
The Journal of Economic Perspectives 7 (3):97-115.
Schiller, Wendy J. 1995. Senators as Political Entrepreneurs: Using Bill Sponsorship to Shape
Legislative Agendas. American Journal of Political Science 39 (1):186-203.
Sinclair, Barbara. 1986. The Role of Committees in Agenda Setting in the U.S. Congress.
Legislative Studies Quarterly 11 (1):35-45.
Soroka, Stuart N. 2002. Agenda-Setting Dynamics in Canada: Vancouver, UBC Press.
Stearn, Douglas W. 2004. Deterring the Importation of Counterfeit Pharmaceutical Products.
Food and Drug Law Journal 59 (4):537-561.
Stewart, Charles III , and Jonathan Woon. Congressional Committee Assignments, 103rd to
110th Congresses, 1993--2007: House and Senate, January 23, 2009. 2009 [cited.
Available from http://web.mit.edu/17.251/www/data_page.html#2.
106

Stimson, James A. 1995. Dynamic Representation. The American Political Science Review 89
(3):543-565.
Stores, Katie R., and Jeffrey Worsham. 2008. Across the Border: Diagnosing the Prescription
Drug Importation Agenda. In Midwest Political Science Association. Chicago, Illinois.
Swann, JP. 1999. The 1941 Sulfathiazole Disaster and the Birth of Good Manufacturing
Practices. PDA Journal of Pharmaceutical Science and Technology 53 (3):148-53.
Talbert, Jeffrey, Bryan Jones, and Frank Baumgartner. 1995. Nonlegislative Hearing and Policy
Change in Congress. American Journal of Political Science 39 (2):383-405.
Talbert, Jeffrey c., Bryan D. Jones, and Frank R. Baumgartner. 1995. Nonlegislative Hearings
and Policy Change in Congress. American Journal of Political Science 39 (May):383406.
Temin, Peter. 1980. Taking Your Medicine: Drug Regulation in the United States. Cambridge:
Harvard University Press.
Teufel, Adam. 2006. Legalized Importation of Candadian Prescription Drugs: Short-term
Solution to a Long-term Problem. Jounral of Contemporary Health and Law Policy 22
(2):383-408.
Thompson, Cheryl A. 2004. Drug Importation not the right answer, Nobel economist says.
American Journal of Health-System Pharmacy 61:546-547.
Thurber, James A. 1991. Dynamics of Policy Subsystems In American Politics. In Interest
Groups Politics, edited by A. J. Cigler and B. Loomis. Washington, D.C.: CQ Press.
True, James L., Bryan D. Jones, and Frank Baumgartner. Punctuated-Equilibrium Theory:
Explaining Stability and Change in America 2007 [cited August 16, 2007. Available
from www.policyagendas.org/publications/agendasproject.html.
Truman, David. 1951. The Government Process. New York: Knopf.
Villarreal, Angeles M. 2001, July 25. Orphan Drug Act: Background and Proposed Legislation
in the 107th Congress: Congressional Research Service.
Voelker, Rebecca. 2003. Northern Rxposure: US Canada Clash on Cross-Border Medication
Sales. Journal of American Medical Association 290 (22):2921-2925.
Wardell, William, William Vodra, Judith K. Jones, and Richard N. Spivey. 2007. Evolution and
Future Prospects of Pharmaceutical Industry Regulation. In Handbook of Pharmaceutical
Public Policy, edited by T. R. Fulda and A. I. Wertheimer. New York: Pharmaceutical
Product Press.
Wawro, Gregory. 2000. Legislative Entrepreneurship in the U.S. House of Representatives. Ann
Arbor: University of Michigan Press.
Wechsler, Jill. 2005. Drug Safety Fears May Limit Reimporting and Shape R&D.
Pharmaceutical Technology, February 2005, 26-34.
Wertheimer, Albert I., and Thomas Santella. 2007. Drug Importation and Reimportation. In
Handbook of Pharmaceutical Public Policy, edited by T. R. Fulda and A. I. Wertheimer.
New York: Pharmaecutical Product Press.
Wildavsky, Aaron, and Naomi Caiden. 2004. The New Politics of the Budgetary Process. Fifth
ed. New York: Pearson Longman.
Wilkerson, John D., Jens T. Feeley, Nicole S. Schiereck, and Christina Sue. 2002. Using Bills
and Hearings to Trace Attention in Congress: Policy Windows in Health Care
Legislating. In Policy Dynamics, edited by F. Baumgartner and B. D. Jones.
: Chicago, The University of Chicago Press.
Wood, Donna J. 1986. Strategic Uses of Public Policy: Business and Government in the
107

Progressive Era. Marshfield: Pitman Publishing Inc.
Worsham, Jeffrey. 1997. Other People's Money: Policy Change, Congress, and Bank
Regulation. Boulder: Westview Press.
———. 1998. Wavering Equilibruims: Subsystem Dynamics and Agenda Control. American
Politics Quarterly 26 (4):485-512.
———. 2006. Up in Smoke: Mapping Subsystem Dynamics in Tobacco Policy. The Policy
Studies Journal 34 (3):437-452.
Worsham, Jeffrey, and Chaun Stores. 2004. 40 Acres and a Mule: The Congressional treatment
of African American farmers, 1945-1996. In 2004 Annual Meeting of the Midwest
Political Science Association. Chiago, April 2004.
Young, Donna. 2004. Experts Debate Drug Importation. American Journal of Health-System
Pharmacy 61:874.
———. 2005. Importation Reports Spur More Debate about Drug Prices. American Journal of
Health-System Pharmacy 62:233-234.
Young, James Harvey. 1989. Pure Food: Securing the Federal Food and Drugs Act of 1906.
Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press.

John
H.
Hagen

Digitally signed by
John H. Hagen
DN: cn=John H. Hagen,
o=West Virginia
University Libraries,
ou=Acquisitions
Department,
email=John.
Hagen@mail.wvu.edu,
c=US
Date: 2009.07.28
14:43:57 -04'00'

108

